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Abstract—This paper presents a comprehensive literature re-
view on applications of economic and pricing models for resource
management in cloud networking. To achieve sustainable profit
advantage, cost reduction, and flexibility in provisioning of cloud
resources, resource management in cloud networking requires
adaptive and robust designs to address many issues, e.g., resource
allocation, bandwidth reservation, request allocation, and work-
load allocation. Economic and pricing models have received a lot
of attention as they can lead to desirable performance in terms
of social welfare, fairness, truthfulness, profit, user satisfaction,
and resource utilization. This paper reviews applications of the
economic and pricing models to develop adaptive algorithms and
protocols for resource management in cloud networking. Besides,
we survey a variety of incentive mechanisms using the pricing
strategies in sharing resources in edge computing. In addition, we
consider using pricing models in cloud-based Software Defined
Wireless Networking (cloud-based SDWN). Finally, we highlight
important challenges, open issues and future research directions
of applying economic and pricing models to cloud networking.
Keywords- Cloud networking, resource management, pricing
models, economic models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is becoming the platform of choice for a
number of applications due to the advantages of high com-
puting power, low service cost, high scalability, accessibility,
and availability. Cloud computing is used as an integral part of
society in various domains and disciplines such as education
[1], commerce [2], health care services [3], transportation [4],
and social networks [5]. Cloud computing is expected to bring
huge new revenue opportunities. Recent reports have showed
that the global revenue generated from cloud services is more
than $200 billion in 2016, and there will be approximately
3.6 billion Internet users accessing cloud services by 2018
(http://www.statista.com). On-demand services provided by
cloud computing include, for example, Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure-as-a-
Service (IaaS). Google Docs [6], Google App Engine [7],
and Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon’s EC2) [8]
are among the popular commercial services available in cloud
computing.
The cloud computing infrastructure is typically hosted in
data centers. Therefore, the current cloud services are based on
parallel implementations in distributed data centers connected
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with each other through high speed networks. For example,
the EU-funded Scalable and Adaptive Internet Solution (Eu-
funded SAIL) project [9] investigates a combination of cloud
computing infrastructure and networking capabilities, called
cloud networking. Cloud networking actually considers the
network beyond the data centers with the aim of providing
both on-demand computing and network resources. With cloud
networking, the resources and services can be provisioned
from interconnecting distributed data centers owned by one
or multiple providers, called cloud data center networking.
The cloud resources and services can also be integrated with
mobile networks, i.e., mobile cloud networking. Moreover,
edge computing models are deployed in cloud networking to
bring the cloud resources and services close to users, and
thus minimize overall costs, jitter, latencies, and network load.
The aforementioned models of cloud networking along with
the integration of the Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
technology are expected to support and satisfy a large number
of users and applications in terms of flexibility, cost and
availability of the services.
However, managing network and cloud resources together in
cloud networking has many challenges. It is crucial to have an
integrated view of the existing physical and virtual topologies
and characteristics of the resources, as well as the status of
all network entities. Besides, the provisioning and placement
of virtual resources must be done in the best way possible,
taking into account the available resources of both the cloud
and networks. Moreover, the reconfigurations must often be
performed to resize or release the existing virtual resources
due to, e.g., the dynamic network environments (node or link
failure), and the variability/elasticity of resource demand. In-
efficient resource management negatively affects performance
and cost as well as impairing system functionality.
To address the aforementioned challenges, it is vital to
develop resource management approaches which guarantee
the scalability, efficiency, manageability, adaptability and reli-
ability for cloud networking. Traditional approaches, e.g., the
system optimization, merely focus on the system performance
metrics given system parameters and constraints rather than
economic factors, e.g., the profit, cost, and revenue. Therefore,
economic and pricing approaches have been recently explored,
developed, and adopted for resource management in cloud net-
working. Compared with the system optimization approaches,
the economic and pricing approaches provide the following
advantages:
• In cloud networking, the profits of cloud providers have to
be maximized while meeting the user demands. Thus, the
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2profit guarantee for all cloud providers is a primary goal.
Pricing models based on, e.g., the profit maximization or
cost minimization, have been efficiently used to achieve
the goal.
• There are various actors/stakeholders in cloud network-
ing which belong to different entities, e.g., end-users,
infrastructure providers, service providers, brokers, and
network operators. They have different objectives, e.g.,
the profit, revenue, cost and utility, as well as different
constraints, e.g., the budget and technology. Their objec-
tives often conflict with each other, and this makes eco-
nomic and pricing models become effective tools in cloud
networking. More specifically, through the use of negoti-
ation mechanisms, economic and pricing approaches can
determine optimal solutions for selfish entities given their
constraints.
• The demand for cloud computing and network resources
depends on many users’ attributes, e.g., the willingness
to pay and performance requirements. Pricing strategies
which rely on the demand elasticity such as price dis-
crimination have been recently used as ideal solutions
to optimize the provisioning of resources and profits of
providers.
• Video on Demand (VoD) undoubtedly is among the most
important services in cloud networking. Several commer-
cial video delivery services have been introduced and
become popular, e.g., YouTube and Netflix. However, the
bandwidth cost of the service is typically very significant.
Pricing mechanisms, e.g., smart data pricing, have been
applied to regulate the user demands and maximize the
bandwidth utilization.
• Besides the high bandwidth utilization for providers,
guaranteeing quality of service (QoS), e.g., a small delay,
for users is very important. Pricing approaches provide
very efficient solutions for the joint optimization of both
providers and users.
• To reduce service delay for users, cloud networking has
developed edge computing models which employ devices
at network edges to provide closer cloud resources and
services to users. Pricing and payment strategies stimu-
late users to use the edge resources rather than distant
data centers while still guaranteeing profits for cloud
providers.
Although there are several surveys related to cloud network-
ing, they do not focus on economic and pricing approaches,
which are emerging as a promising tool. For example, a survey
of applications of network virtualization for cloud computing
was given in [10]. The survey of technologies of the Network-
as-a-Service (NaaS) paradigm for supporting network-cloud
convergence was presented in [11]. There are also surveys
related to the architecture of SDNs, e.g., [12], [13], [14],
[15], and applications of edge computing [16]. There are
surveys related to the pricing approaches, e.g., [17], [18], [19].
However, they addressed the issues in Internet or wireless
networks only. To the best of our knowledge, there is no survey
specifically discussing the use of economic and pricing models
to deal with resource management in cloud networking. This
motivates us to develop the survey with the comprehensive
literature review on the economic and pricing models in cloud
networking.
For convenience, the related works in this survey are
classified based on various models of cloud networking and
then their issues as shown in Table II. The models of cloud
networking considered in this survey are cloud data center
networking, mobile cloud networking, edge computing, and
cloud-based Video-on-Demand (VoD) systems. Furthermore,
some pricing approaches for the resource management in
cloud-based Software Defined Wireless Networking (cloud-
based SDWN) are discussed. Advantages and disadvantages
of each approach are highlighted.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes a general architecture of cloud networking. Sec-
tion III introduces the fundamentals of economic and pricing
models. Section IV discusses how to apply economic and
pricing models for resource management in cloud data center
networking such as bandwidth, request, and workload alloca-
tion. Applications of economic and pricing models for resource
allocation in mobile cloud networking are given in Section V.
Section VI reviews economic and pricing models to address
issues concerning the bandwidth allocation, task allocation,
and storage sharing in edge computing. Section VII considers
economic and pricing approaches for bandwidth allocation
and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) caching in cloud-based VoD system.
In addition, applications of economic and pricing models for
bandwidth allocation and mobile data offloading in cloud-
based SDWN are given in Section VIII. We outline important
challenges, open issues, and future research directions in
Section IX. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section X. The
list of abbreviations appeared in this paper are given in Table I.
II. GENERAL ARCHITECTURE OF CLOUD NETWORKING
A. Definition of cloud networking
The term cloud networking is understood in a multi-
administrative domain scenario in which network and data
center domains interact with each other through predefined
interfaces [20], [21]. Specifically, cloud networking extends
network virtualization beyond the data centers to provide cloud
and network resources to clients/users. Network resources can
be virtual routers, bandwidth, virtual firewalls, or any network
management software.
The definition also shows a key difference between the
cloud networking and traditional computer networks, that is
the network virtualization. By using network virtualization,
the cloud networking reduces the cost for both providers and
clients through real-time, on-demand resource and service
provisioning. The resources are assigned and used by the
client’s needs, and the client only pays for what is used [22].
On the contrary, resource allocation in traditional computer
networks is static, and a client needs to pay for every cost
regardless of whether the resource has been used or not.
B. Architecture of cloud networking
The goal of a cloud networking architecture is to enable
an efficient composition of cloud and network resources in a
3TABLE I
MAJOR ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Description
BBU BaseBand processing Units
Cloud-RAN Cloud-Radio Access Network
CAPEX CAPital EXpenditure
CWMSN Cloud-based Wireless Multimedia Social Network
IaaS Infrastructure-as-a-Service
IoT Internet of Things
MCN Mobile Cloud Networking
MNO Mobile Network Operator
NFV Network Function Virtualization
NUM Network Utility Maximization
OPEX OPerational EXpenditure
P2P Peer-to-Peer
PaaS Platform-as-a-Service
RRH Remote Radio Head
SaaS Software-as-a-Service
SDN Software-Defined Networking
SDWN Software-Defined Wireless Networking
SLA Service-Level Agreement
SP Service Provider
VCG Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
VM Virtual Machine
VoD Video on Demand
cloud environment. To achieve the goal, several architectures
were proposed for cloud networking. They can be based on
intra-data center networking and inter-data center networking
which are commonly called the cloud data center networking
[11], [20], [23], [24], [25]. They can be based on mobile cloud
networking [26], [27] or edge computing models [28] [29],
[30], [31].
Based on these architectures, we provide a general, unified
architecture for cloud networking as shown in Fig. 1. The
architecture has three major parts: (i) cloud data center net-
working, (ii) mobile cloud networking, and (iii) edge comput-
ing. Their descriptions are given in what follows. Note that
these parts can be independent from each other. Stakeholders
or actors commonly participating in cloud networking are as
follows.
• Cloud provider: A cloud provider, e.g, an IaaS cloud
provider, owns and manages data centers and system
software.
• Network provider: A network provider provides network
connectivities among data centers of cloud providers or
between end-users and data centers. In cloud networking,
the network providers aim at cooperating with cloud
providers to allocate cloud network resources and services
to end-users or cloud users.
• Cloud tenant/cloud user: A cloud tenant can be a service
provider, an organization or an enterprise, which uses
cloud resources to host applications offered to its end-
users. Netflix (https://www.netflix.com/) is an example of
a service provider of video on demand.
• Cloud service broker: A cloud service broker (or broker
for the sake of shortness) acts as an intermediary between
cloud users/end-users and cloud providers.
• End-users: The users generate resource and service re-
quests or workloads that need to be processed using cloud
resources.
1) Cloud data center networking: A data center is a large
group of networked computer servers which are capable of
providing the remote storage, processing, or distribution of
large amounts of data. We provide brief descriptions of the
components and resources in both intra- and inter-data center
networking to which they will be referred in this survey.
• Intra-data center networking: Intra-data center network-
ing refers to the interconnection between servers and
storage resources through a networking system within
a data center. The networking system includes virtual
switches, Top-of-Rack (ToR) switches, core switches, and
non-broking switch.
– Virtual Machine (VM): VM is a software program or
operating system which is able to perform tasks such
as running applications and programs as a separate
computer [32]. Multiple VMs can exist within a
physical server or machine through virtualization
techniques. In cloud networking, a VM can be mi-
grated among servers within a data center or between
data centers owned by different providers.
– Virtual switch: A virtual switch is generally a
software-based Ethernet switch function running in-
side a server. It can support Ethernet and/or IP
services and provide switching and routing context
separation among tenants/users sharing the same
server.
– Network slicing: Network slicing allows compart-
mentalizing VMs of the same application into the
same virtual networks [33] and guarantees virtual
resource isolation and virtual network performance.
– ToR switch: A ToR switch supports Ethernet virtual
LAN (VLAN) services or simple IP routing for the
data center. The ToR switch aggregates Ethernet
links from the servers. ToR switches are connected
to one or two core switches in a data center.
– Non-blocking switch: A switch is called non-
blocking if it is able to connect all ports such that
any routing request to any free output port can
be established successfully without interfering other
traffics.
– Core switch: A core switch hosts multiple ToR
switches and large-scale virtual LAN services or
simple IP routing for the data center.
• Inter-data center networking: Data centers can be inter-
connected across the Wide Area Network (WAN) using
inter-data center networking. Some commonly referred
entities in the inter-data center networking are as follows.
– Data center gateway: A data center gateway provides
connectivity among data centers and to Internet and
4TABLE II
A TAXONOMY OF THE APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD NETWORKING
aaaaaaaaaDesign issues
System models Cloud data
center networking
(Section IV)
Mobile cloud
networking
(Section V)
Edge
computing
(Section VI)
Cloud-based
VoD system
(Section VII)
Cloud-based
SDWN
(Section VIII)
Bandwidth allocation X X X X X
Resource allocation X X
Task allocation X
Request allocation X
Workload allocation X
Storage sharing X
P2P caching X
Mobile data offloading X
VPN customers. The data center gateway can provide
virtual routing and switching capabilities.
– IP/MPLS network: An Internet Protocol/Multi-
Protocol Label Switching (IP/MPLS) network is a
packet-switched network that employs the Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) enhanced with the MPLS stan-
dard.
– Resource pool: A resource pool is a collective set of
resources in data centers.
– Federated cloud networking: Federated or federation
cloud networking refers to the cooperation among
cloud providers to establish the federated cloud re-
source. For the federated cloud networking, a cloud
provider can “borrow” cloud resources from other
providers if its own resources are overloaded. This
is called outsourcing. Also, a cloud provider can
“rent out” its resources to other cloud providers if
its resources are free. This is called insourcing.
2) Mobile cloud networking: Mobile Cloud Networking
(MCN) is the EU FP7 Large-scale Integrating Project (IP)
(cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/future-networks). It focuses on inte-
grating the cloud computing and network function virtual-
ization technologies to mobile networks [34]. MCN is able
to provision services involving mobile network, decentralized
computing, and storage as one on-demand unified service. The
main characteristics of MCN are as follows [26]:
• MCN improves the real-time performance of mobile
network functions, e.g., the baseband unit processing,
mobility management, and QoS control, based on the
high-performance cloud computing infrastructure. Thus,
MCN enables adapting to the elasticity of the load.
• MCN provides an entirely new mobile cloud application
platform as well as novel revenue streams for Telco by
orchestrating infrastructure and services across different
domains including wireless, mobile core networks, and
data centers.
• MCN has the 3GPP LTE compliant architecture to exploit
and support cloud computing.
• MCN introduces a new business actor, i.e., the MCN
provider, in addition to typical stakeholders, e.g., the
cloud computing provider, application provider, and
users.
A wide range of services is offered by MCN: (i) typical
cloud computing atomic services, e.g., the computing, stor-
age, and networking, (ii) support services, e.g., Monitoring
as a Service (MaaS), (iii) virtualized network infrastructure
services, e.g., Radio Access Network-as-a-Service (RANaaS)
and Evolved Packet Core-as-a-Service (EPCaaS), (iv) new
virtualized applications and services, e.g., Content Delivery
Networks-as-a-Service (CDNaaS), and (v) End-to-End (E2E)
services. In particular, RANaaS allows to partially move
functionalities of RAN, i.e., digital processing functions, to
a data center depending on the actual needs and network
characteristics [35]. When all RAN functionalities are shifted
towards the data center, and only RF functions are performed
at Remote Radio Head (RRH), we have the concept of Cloud-
RAN or Centralized-RAN [36]. The RANaaS implementation
has the following major characteristics [37]:
• On-demand provisioning: Mobile network resources and
services are provisioned according to the demand elastic-
ity of mobile users.
• Virtualization of RAN resources and functions: They aim
at optimizing usage, management, and scalability of the
mobile network.
• Resource pooling: This allows virtual operators to share
more dedicated resources and services, and thus enabling
more business opportunities.
• Elasticity: This characteristic enables scaling network
resources at the data centers or controlling the number
of active RRHs.
• Service metering: Operators provision and charge RAN
operation services, e.g., the usage of RRHs, on a mea-
surable and controllable basis.
• Multi-tenancy: This feature ensures the security in the
mobile network by enabling isolation mechanisms and
charging of different users.
3) Edge computing: Edge computing is a paradigm which
pushes the frontier of computing applications, data, and ser-
vices away from central nodes, e.g., the data centers, to the
periphery or edges of the network [38]. Edge computing
covers a wide range of technologies including cloudlet, re-
mote/micro/community clouds, nano data centers, volunteer
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Fig. 1. A general architecture of cloud networking.
computing system, local cloud/fog computing, client-assisted
cloud system, sensing networks, e.g., the wireless sensor net-
work and crowdsensing network, and distributed Peer-to-Peer
(P2P). Edge computing has the following major advantages
[39]:
• It significantly reduces the data traffic, cost, and latency
and improves QoS since cloud resources and services are
located close to users.
• It alleviates the major bottleneck and the risk of a poten-
tial point of failure since it does not rely on centralized
computing.
• It enhances security since data is encrypted as the data is
moved towards the network edge.
• It provides high levels of scalability, reliability, and
automation.
4) Software-Defined Networking (SDN): A traditional net-
work architecture is composed of three planes of functionality,
i.e., data, control and management planes. The control plane
makes forwarding/routing decisions on the user traffic based
on forwarding/routing tables. The data plane is responsible
for forwarding the user traffic using the decisions from the
control plane. The control and data planes are always coupled
and embedded in the same networking devices, e.g., switches
and routers, to guarantee network resilience. However, such
architecture is rigid and complex to manage and control [40],
[41]. The Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [13], [42],
[43] is an emerging networking paradigm towards simple and
flexible network management for network operators. SDN
is defined as “a network architecture where the forwarding
state in the data plane is managed by a remotely controlled
plane decoupled from the former” [13]. In other words, SDN
decouples the control plane from the network devices to
become an external entity, the so-called SDN controller. The
SDN architecture has four major features below:
• The control and data planes are decoupled, and network
devices just act as forwarding elements.
• Forwarding decisions are flow-based instead of
destination-based, meaning that all packets in the
same flow receive identical service policies at the
forwarding devices. This allows to unify different types
of network devices, e.g., routers, switches, firewalls,
load-balancers, and traffic shapers.
6• The control logic is moved to an external entity, i.e., the
SDN controller or the Network Operating System (NOS).
• The network is programmable through software applica-
tions running on the SDN controller which interacts with
the underlying data plane devices.
These features of SDN make the networks more pro-
grammable and easily partitionable and virtualizable. In prac-
tice, SDN has been used to address many issues in a wide
range of network environments [44]. For example, it was
used to address the security and resource allocation in en-
terprise networks [45], [46], flow control, virtual data center
embedding, and resource utilization maximization in cloud
networking [24], [47], [48], mobility management and load
balancing in wireless access networks [49], wavelength path
control and QoS-aware unified control in optimal networks
[50], and network management in home and small business
networks [51]. In particular for the cloud networking, using
SDN makes a number of network devices become simple
forwarding elements which are cheap and easy to deploy.
This reduces both capital and operational expenditures for
cloud and service providers. It is also expected to significantly
improve benefits for all stakeholders, especially when SDN
can be combined with the economic and pricing models which
will be discussed in the next section.
III. OVERVIEW AND FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMIC AND
PRICING THEORY APPLIED IN CLOUD NETWORKING
Economic and pricing approaches have been applied to
address many issues in cloud networking due to the aforemen-
tioned benefits. In this section, we classify the economic and
pricing approaches commonly used for resource management
in cloud networking as shown in Fig. 2. The classification
is based on how the prices are set, i.e., market-based pricing,
game theoretic and auction based pricing, and Network Utility
Maximization (NUM) based pricing.
A. Market-Based Pricing
In the following, we present the pricing models based on
economic and financial concepts which have been applied in
the cloud networking. We first present a simple pricing model,
i.e., cost-based pricing, and then describe more complex pric-
ing models including differential pricing, profit maximization
pricing, and Ramsey pricing.
1) Cost-based pricing: Cost-based pricing is a common
pricing strategy to determine the price of a service based
on calculating the total cost of the service and adding a
percentage of the cost as a desired profit. The objective of
using the cost-based pricing is to ensure that the price makes
the service provider profitable, or at least the price covers
the total cost of the service provider. The total cost generally
consists of a fixed cost and a variable cost. The fixed cost is
the cost that does not change when the number of sales of the
services changes. For example, hardware costs, e.g., servers
and network devices. On the contrary, the variable cost varies
according to the number of sales of the services produced. For
example, the resource costs, e.g., energy and bandwidth costs,
the cost of data transfer between different data centers, and the
cost of cloud server usage, are the variable cost for generating
cloud services. The advantage of the cost-based pricing is the
ease of setting the price since the price is a function of the
internal cost, i.e., the cost required to generate the service
[52]. However, this pricing strategy does not consider external
market factors, e.g., the pricing strategies of other providers
and the perceive value and willingness to pay of buyers.
In cloud networking, the cost-based pricing has been used
by cloud providers for evaluating the service cost in geo-
diverse data center networks [53], [54]. It has been also
employed to analyze the cost saving when SDN and the Net-
work Function Virtualization (NFV) in the cloud are enabled
[55], [56]. However, the internal cost information in cloud
networking may not be easy to obtain due to the variable cost
diversity. For example, the variable cost could depend on the
geography of data centers. Further details on the cost-based
pricing model can be found in [57], [58].
2) Differential pricing: The cost-based pricing ignores the
requirements and preferences of cloud users or tenants. To
maximize the profit of providers, differential pricing, also
called price discrimination, can be used. Consider a cloud
resource market consisting of a cloud provider with its cloud
resources, i.e., the computing resource and network bandwidth.
Using the differential pricing, the cloud provider may charge
different prices to different cloud users based on their demand
and willingness to pay. By setting higher prices for one type
of user, the use of the differential pricing actually transfers
the user surplus to the provider. Here, the user surplus is the
difference between the total money that users are willing to
pay and the total money that they actually pay. Thus, although
this pricing guarantees a high revenue for the provider, it
can be unfair to cause one type of user to pay a greater
price than another type of user. In cloud networking, the
differential pricing has been applied for bandwidth allocation
among groups of users having different elasticities on cloud
resources or among cloud users having different flexibility in
resource usage as proposed in [59]. In current cloud service
markets, the differential pricing is used to set prices of the
cloud services based on the requirements of the users. For
example, the Alibaba group (https://intl.aliyun.com/) offers
lower prices to users which require the cloud services for long
term, e.g., 1 year.
3) Profit maximization: Profit maximization is the process
of determining the output quantity and the corresponding price
which yield the highest profit for a provider [60]. We present
briefly how to find the optimal quantity and price based on
the profit maximization in the following. Assume that a cloud
provider needs to determine the number of cloud resource
(i.e., the computing and network bandwidth) units, denoted
by Q and the corresponding price P for their cloud users.
The profit of the cloud provider is pi = R(P,Q) − C(Q),
where R(·, ·) is the total revenue and C(·) is the total cost.
The total cost may involve a fixed cost and a variable cost.
The revenue is the amount of money that the cloud provider
receives from selling Q resource units to its users. The optimal
quantity of cloud resource units, i.e., Q∗, is determined such
that the profit is maximized, i.e., Q∗ = max
Q
pi. The optimal
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quantity allows to find the optimal price based on the demand
curve. The demand curve is typically a linear curve to show
the relationship between the price of a resource unit and the
quantity of resource units that users are willing to buy. A
general demand curve can be expressed as P = a−bQ, where
a and b are proper parameters. Thus, at Q = Q∗, the optimal
price is P ∗ = a− bQ∗.
The optimal quantity and price can be determined using the
graph as shown in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b). Fig. 3(a) shows the
curves of the total cost, total revenue, and profit. The optimal
quantity Q∗ is determined at the positive peak value of the
profit curve. Then, the optimal price P ∗ is obtained from the
demand curve in Fig. 3(b). However, in real markets, it is
not easy to determine the demand curve. The user demand
can be random or assumed to follow some distributions, e.g.,
the Gaussian [61]. Moreover, the profit maximization does not
consider the market competition in determining the quantity
and price. In cloud networking, the profit maximization has
been adopted to allocate computing and network resources to
users [62] or to assign resource requests from users to cloud
providers [63].
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Fig. 3. Pricing based on profit maximization.
4) Ramsey pricing: In Ramsey pricing, different prices
of the same commodity are applied to different markets
depending on the demand elasticity of the commodity [64].
Ramsey pricing is similar to the differential pricing. However,
unlike the differential pricing that maximizes the profit of
the provider, Ramsey pricing aims to maximize the social
welfare of users subject to a predefined threshold on the
provider’s profit. Specifically, assume that a cloud provider
provides cloud resource units in two independent markets. The
cloud provider determines different prices (p1, p2) in the two
markets. In the independent market setting, the demands of
the resource corresponding to two prices are (q1(p1), q2(p2)).
The marginal cost of offering one cloud resource unit in both
markets is c, and the cloud provider has a fixed cost. The
objective of the cloud provider is to determine (p1, p2) to
maximize social welfare subject to the constraint that the profit
of the cloud provider is not less than a threshold. Here, the
social welfare is the consumer surplus which is the area on
the left of the demand curve and above the price as shown
in Fig. 3(b). The threshold is a fixed profit value pi∗ which is
predefined by the cloud provider. Therefore, the optimization
problem of the cloud provider can be formulated as follows:
max
(p1,p2)
2∑
i=1
(∫ ∞
pi
qi(p)dp
)
(1)
s.t.
2∑
i=1
(pi − c)qi(pi) ≥ pi∗.
The problem in (1) can be solved using the Lagrange
multiplier method. The relationship between the optimal price
and the demand elasticity in market i, i ∈ {1, 2}, is expressed
as follows:
p∗i − c
p∗i
=
1− λ∗
λ∗
1
i
, (2)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier, and i =
dqi(p
∗
i )
dpi
p∗i
qi
is the
coefficient of price elasticity of demand for the resource in
market i. The price elasticity of demand gives the percentage
change in quantity demanded according to a fall or a rise in
its price. We get the following relationship from (2):
p∗1 − c
p∗1
/
p∗2 − c
p∗2
=
2
1
. (3)
The expression in (3) shows that the price of a resource in
a market should be relatively low when the demand elasticity
in the market is high. On the contrary, in a market with
inelastic or less elastic demand, the provider can set a high
price because the demand for the resource does not change
significantly according to a fall or a rise in the price. Clearly,
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since it can increase the price to earn more revenue. How-
ever, determining demand elasticity in markets is challenging.
Moreover, the cloud provider cannot apply this pricing in the
long run since users charged with a higher price will seek
alternatives [65]. One application of the Ramsey pricing in
cloud networking is to regulate traffic flows of users among
data centers [66], which will be discussed in Section IV-A8.
B. Game Theory and Auction Based Pricing
Game theory and auctions are the study of multiparticipant
decision making problems in which a choice of a participant,
i.e., a player, potentially affects the interests of other partici-
pants [67]. In the context of cloud networking, participants can
be cloud providers, service providers, cloud tenants, and users.
In the following, we briefly present game theoretic models
and auction mechanisms which have been widely used to
determine resource prices in the cloud networking. First, some
important terminologies are defined below [68].
• Player: A player is a participant which makes a decision
in the game.
• Payoff : A payoff, i.e., a utility, a profit, or an interest,
reflects the desired outcome of the player.
• Strategy: Player’s strategy is a set of actions/instructions
that the player can follow to achieve a desired outcome.
The payoff depends on not only the player’s own action,
but also the actions of others.
• Rationality: A player is rational if its strategy always aims
at maximizing its own payoff.
1) Non-cooperative game: In the non-cooperative game,
each player maximizes only its own payoff neither being
concerned about the payoff of the other players nor about the
social welfare of the network [69]. In this game, the players are
selfish, and they do not form coalitions or make agreements
with each other.
Consider a cloud resource market in which cloud providers
as the sellers compete for selling resources to users. The sellers
are typically selfish, and therefore the market can be modeled
as a non-cooperative game among the sellers along with their
pricing strategies. Assume that there are N players, and Pi
is a set of pricing strategies of player i, where P = P1 ×
· · · × PN is the Cartesian product of the individual strategy
sets. Let pi ∈ Pi be the pricing strategy of player i. A vector
of strategies of N players is p = (p1, . . . , pN ), and a vector
of corresponding payoffs is pi = (pi1(p), . . . , piN (p)) ∈ RN ,
where pii(p) is the payoff of player i given the player’s chosen
strategy and strategies of the others. Each player chooses its
best strategy p∗i which maximizes its payoff. A set of strategies
p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
N ) ∈ P is the Nash equilibrium if no player
can gain higher payoff by changing its own strategy when the
strategies of the others remain the same [70], i.e.,
∀i, pi ∈ Pi : pii(p∗i ,p∗i ) ≥ pii(pi,p∗i ), (4)
where pi = (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN ) is a vector of strat-
egy choices of all players except player i.
The inequality in (4) shows the stable state of the game
in which the players have no incentive to change their own
strategies since the payoffs will be worse off. However, in
some cases, there is no Nash equilibrium at all, or there may
exist multiple Nash equilibria which can make players not
be clear about which one to choose. Therefore, checking the
existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is important
when setting prices based on the non-cooperative game.
The non-cooperative game theory has been widely used for
the resource management in cloud networking. For example, it
has been used to model the bandwidth sharing among peers in
cloud-assisted P2P streaming systems [71] or among brokers
in cloudlet systems [72]. It has been adopted to maximize the
profits of cloud providers as presented in [73].
2) Stackelberg game: The non-cooperative game discussed
above assumes that players announce their pricing strategies
simultaneously, and the players know each other’s strategies
at the same time. However, this may not always hold in
real markets. Therefore, sequential games can be used in
which players can announce their strategies following a certain
predefined order. This is the Stackelberg game [74]. In the
Stackelberg game, the player decides its own strategic choice
after observing the strategies of other players [75]. It was
proved that even if the players have to choose their strategies
first, their payoffs are not less than those at the Nash equilib-
rium [76], i.e., due to the first-mover advantage. The following
provides the definition and properties of the Stackelberg game.
Assume that there are two cloud resource sellers 1 and 2
in the market. P1 and P2 are the sets of pricing strategies
of sellers 1 and 2, respectively. Seller 1 chooses its pricing
strategy p1 from set P1 to maximize its payoff or profit
function pi1(p1, p2), and seller 2 chooses its pricing strategy
p2 from set P2 to maximize its payoff function pi2(p1, p2).
Without loss of generality, assume that seller 2 selects its
strategy before seller 1 decides its selection. Seller 2 is namely
the leader, and seller 1 is called the follower. We have the
following definition [77]:
Definition 1. If there exists a mapping F : P2 → P1 such
that, for any fixed p2 ∈ P2, pi1(Fp2, p2) ≥ pi1(p1, p2), ∀p1 ∈
P1, and if there exists p2s2 ∈ P2 such that pi2(Fp2s2, p2s2) ≥
pi2(Fp2, p2), then the pair (p1s2, p2s2) ∈ P1 × P2, where
p1s2 = Fp2s2, is called a Stackelberg strategy pair.
Definition 1 means that the Stackelberg strategy is optimal
for the leader when the follower responds to the leader with
the follower’s optimal strategy. Let D1 = {(p1, p2) ∈ P1×P2 :
p1 = Fp2} denote the rational reaction set of seller 1 when
seller 2 chooses strategy p2 ∈ P2. Seller 1 is referred to as
a rational player. Similarly, when seller 1 is the leader, let
D2 denote the rational reaction set of seller 2. The sets D1
and D2 have significant importance which is indicated in the
following two propositions.
Proposition 1. A strategy pair (p1s2, p2s2) is the Stackel-
berg strategy with seller 2 as the leader iff (p1s2, p2s2) ∈ D1
and
pi2(p1s2, p2s2) ≥ pi2(p1, p2),∀(p1, p2) ∈ D1. (5)
Proposition 2. A strategy pair (p1N , p2N ) is the Nash
strategy pair iff (p1N , p2N ) ∈ D1 ∩D2.
The expression in (5) and Proposition 2 show that
pi2(p1s2, p2s2) ≥ pi2(p1N , p2N ). In other words, for the leader,
9the Stackelberg strategy guarantees to achieve the payoff at
least as good as the corresponding Nash equilibrium. This is
because when choosing the Stackelberg strategy, the leader
actually imposes a solution which will be favorable to itself.
In cloud networking, the Stackelberg game has been ap-
plied for allocating the cloud provider’s bandwidth to virtual
networks [33] and for reducing the access of users to servers in
the cloud [78]. The Stackelberg game has been also applied
in cloud computing. For example, it was used to maximize
revenue of the cloud provider while maximizing server clients’
utilities [79] or to maximize revenue of the cloud provider
while guaranteeing QoS for its end-users [80]. Besides, the
Stackelberg game has been used in Internet of Things (IoT).
For example, it was adopted to maximize the profits of
different participants of IoT industry value chain [81] and
to improve the QoS and the network’s robustness in sensing
networks [82].
3) Bargaining game: In the bargaining game or Nash bar-
gaining game, two or more players must reach an agreement
regarding how to distribute a monetary amount. Consider trad-
ing bandwidth in cloud networking between a cloud provider,
i.e., a seller, and a cloud tenant, i.e., a buyer. A successful
bargain is reached if and only if the bandwidth is allocated at
a mutually acceptable price. Let p0s be the smallest price that
the seller can accept for selling the bandwidth and p0b be the
buyer’s greatest price that the buyer is willing to pay for the
bandwidth. The pair (p0s, p
0
b) is called the disagreement point
or threat point that the seller and the buyer expect to receive
if their negotiations fail to reach a settlement [83].
The strategy of the seller is to offer the selling price p∗s
to maximize its expected profit pis(ps, p0s), i.e., pis(p
∗
s, p
0
s) ≥
pis(ps, p
0
s), ∀ps. Similarly, the strategy of the buyer is to offer
the buying price p∗b to maximize its profit pib(pb, p
0
b), i.e.,
pib(p
∗
b , p
0
b) ≥ pib(pb, p0b), ∀pb. If p∗b ≥ p∗s , a bargain is enacted
and the transaction price for trading the bandwidth can be
set by [84], p∗ = kp∗b + (1 − k)p∗s , with 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. When
k = 1/2, the transaction price is determined by splitting the
difference between the buyer’s and seller’s offers. A pair of
the best response offer strategies (p∗s, p
∗
b) constitutes the Nash
bargaining solution. At this agreement point, the seller earns
(p∗ − p0s), and the buyer earns (p0b − p∗).
Some other scenarios in cloud networking where the bar-
gaining game has been applied are allocating requests of
users to data centers [85] and sharing cloud resources among
service providers [86]. In cloud computing, the bargaining
game has been used for negotiating the price among the cloud
resource brokers and grid service providers as proposed in
[87] and for pricing and allocating virtual resource instances
for independent tasks and workflow tasks as presented in [88].
4) Auction: An auction is the economic mechanism the
goals of which are to allocate commodities and establish
corresponding prices via a process known as bidding [89].
There are some common terminologies used in the auction as
follows:
• Bidder: A bidder is a buyer which wants to purchase
resources. In cloud networking, bidders can be end-users
or cloud tenants.
• Seller: A seller, e.g., a cloud provider, offers its resources
and services for sale.
• Auctioneer: An auctioneer acts as an intermediate agent to
conduct an auction, determine, and announce the winner.
In many cases, an auctioneer is a seller itself.
• Price: A price in an auction may be a bidding price or
an asking price. The bidding price is the price that the
bidder is willing to pay for a requested resource, and the
asking price is the price of a resource that the seller is
willing to offer.
There exist several studies on auctions as well as their
applications. There are a survey of the auction theory [90],
a survey of auction on Internet [91], or a survey of auction
approaches for resource management in wireless networks
[92]. In what follows, we discuss typical types of auctions
which have been commonly applied to resource management
in cloud networking.
(a) Conventional auctions: A conventional auction is known
as the open-outcry auction. In the open-outcry auction, bids of
buyers are disclosed to each other during the auction. There
are two types of the conventional auction [93].
• English auction: The English auction is an ascending-
bid auction, meaning that the bidding price submitted
by buyers increases monotonically. Specifically, buyers
submit their bidding prices for the resource sequentially
or simultaneously to the auctioneer. The auction will
terminate if there is no new higher price submitted.
The buyer with the highest price wins the resource and
pays the price p∗, i.e., a hammer price, which satisfies
p0s ≤ p∗ ≤ max
i
Bi, where p0s is the lowest price that
the seller can accept to sell, and Bi is buyer i’s budget.
Generally, p∗ changes depending on the number of buyers
in the auction and may not equal p0s.
• Dutch auction: Contrary to the English auction, the
Dutch auction is a descending-bid auction in which the
auctioneer or seller initially sets a high asking price for
the resource and then decreases the price until one of the
buyers accepts the price. The winning buyer pays the final
price and receives the resource. This simple allocation
enables the Dutch auction to spend less time than the
English auction [94].
(b) Vickrey and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions: Vick-
rey and VCG auctions are the sealed-bid auctions in which
buyers submit simultaneously their sealed bids to the auction-
eer. Different from the open-outcry auctions, in the sealed-bid
auction, buyers do not know bidding strategies of each other
and cannot change their own bids during the auction.
• Vickrey auction: A Vickrey auction, also known as the
second-price sealed-bid auction, is one of the two most
important k-th-price sealed-bid auctions. In the Vick-
rey auction, the winning buyer pays the second-highest
price rather than the price that it submitted [95], i.e.,
p∗ = max
p∈P\{pi}
p, where pi is the highest price of the
winner. In other words, the winner pays a price less than
its expected price [96]. Therefore, the Vickrey auction
motivates buyers to bid truthfully, and such an auction
achieves strategy-proofness, or incentive compatibility, or
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truthfulness. The truthfulness is an important property
because an auction which does not hold this property
may be vulnerable to market manipulation and produce
very poor outcomes [97].
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction: The VCG auction
is a generalization of the Vickrey auction with multiple
commodities [98]. The VCG auction allocates commodi-
ties in a socially optimal manner and charges the winner
with the loss of the social value due to its getting the
commodity.
– Assume that there is a set T of M commodities
for sale T = {t1, t2, . . . , tM}, where ti is the ith
commodity, and a set of N buyers, i.e., bidders,
B = {1, 2, . . . , N}.
– Let bi(tj) denote a bid of bidder i for commodity
tj and VMN denote the social welfare value, i.e., the
social cost, created by M commodities.
Similar to the Vickrey auction, if bi(tj) is the highest,
bidder i wins to obtain commodity tj . According to the
VCG auction rule, bidder i pays the price which is equal
to
VMN\{i} − VM\{tj}N\{i} , (6)
where VMN\{i} represents the social welfare value if bidder
i does not participate in the auction, and VM\{tj}N\{i} is
the attainable social welfare value after bidder i wins
commodity tj . The expression in (6) indicates that winner
i needs to pay the price which is the loss in attainable
welfare suffered by the remaining bidders since it got the
commodity tj .
(c) Forward, reverse, and double auctions: Considering the
sides of sellers and buyers, we can classify auctions as follows:
• Forward and reverse auctions: In the forward auction,
there are many potential buyers and one seller. On the
contrary, in the reserve auction, there are one buyer and
many potential sellers.
• Double auction: In the double auction, buyers and sellers
simultaneously submit their bids and asks to an auc-
tioneer, respectively [99]. The basic idea of the double
auction is to match asks from sellers and bids from buyers
by assigning commodities from the sellers to the buyers
and payments from the buyers to the sellers accordingly.
To further understand the double auction process, we
consider a cloud resource market in which the sellers are
cloud providers and the buyers are cloud tenants/users.
Upon receiving bids and asks, the auctioneer sorts the
buyers’ bids in a non-ascending order and the sellers’
asks in a non-descending order. The auctioneer finds the
largest index k at which the asking price is less than the
bidding price, i.e., pak ≤ pbk. The transaction price p∗, i.e.,
a hammer price or clearing price, can be determined as
p∗ = (pak + p
b
k)/2. The buyer receives resources, and the
seller gets payment p∗. The process is repeated to match
the remaining buyers and sellers as well as to determine
corresponding clearing prices.
In fact, the double auction has a very similar concept
to the supply and demand model [100]. As shown in
Fig. 4(a), the asks from sellers and the bids from buyers
form the supply and demand curves, respectively. The
x-axis represents the supplied resource units, and y-axis
represents the asking or the bidding prices. For example,
seller 1 sells Qa1 units of resources at price Pa1 (i.e.,
“Ask 1” in Fig. 4(a)), and buyer 2 bids to buy Qb2 units
of resources at price Pb2 (i.e., “Bid 2” in Fig. 4(a)), and so
on. Fig. 4(a) is actually a discretized form of the standard
supply and demand model which is shown in Fig. 4(b).
The supply and demand curves intersect at a point which
is called the supply-demand equilibrium [101], i.e., the
market equilibrium point (P ∗, Q∗). The clearing price P ∗
at the equilibrium can be determined by (Pa4 + Pb4)/2
(as shown in Fig. 4(a))).
The double auction can hold important properties: indi-
vidual rationality (i.e., no participant loses when joining
the auction), balanced budget (i.e., the auctioneer gains
money), truthfulness (i.e., buyers and sellers submit truth-
fully their bids and asks), and economic efficiency (i.e.,
the social welfare is the best possible).
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(d) Combinatorial auction: In the combinatorial auction,
each bid of a buyer indicates a combination or package of dis-
crete commodities rather than an individual commodity [102].
Given a set of bids, the auctioneer finds an optimal allocation
of the commodities to the buyer, i.e., the winner. The combi-
natorial auction has more advantages compared with standard
auctions, e.g., the sealed-bid auction. These advantages include
little global information requirement, economic efficiency,
utility maximization for buyers, and revenue maximization for
sellers. However, a big challenge in the combinatorial auction
is the winner determination problem. This problem is NP-hard,
and there does not exist a polynomial-time algorithm to find
the optimal allocation. However, many algorithms have been
proposed to find approximate solutions for the problem, e.g.,
the Lagrangian relaxation approach [103].
(e) Shapley value: The aforementioned auction schemes
only consider how to determine the winner and payment.
In practice, the winner can be a group of users, which is
called a virtual winner [104]. How to fairly allocate resources
and share the payment among users in the virtual winner is
still an important problem. The Shapley value method can be
combined with an auction to solve the problem. This section
provides the definition, properties, and applications of the
Shapley value.
The Shapley value is a concept in the cooperative game
theory which provides a unique and fair allocation/distribution
of the total surplus/profit generated by the coalition among
players [105]. Specifically, in a coalition, players may con-
tribute differently to obtain an overall surplus/profit. The
Shapley value provides a method to measure the importance
of each player in the cooperation and to assign the distribution
of generated surplus among the players. Formally, assume
that there is a coalitional game (v,N), where N denotes the
coalition of |N| players, and v or v(N) describes the total
expected surplus obtained from the cooperation of the |N|
players. The amount of surplus that player i in the coalitional
game receives is defined by
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
|S|!(|N| − |S| − 1)
|N|! (v(S ∪ i)− v(S)), (7)
where v(S) is the total surplus obtained from the cooperation
of |S| players in a coalition S. The expression in (7) means that
to calculate the Shapley value of player i in the coalition game
(N, v), we need to determine the marginal contribution of the
player in a potential coalition (S, v) as v(S∪i)−v(S) that is the
difference between the total surplus of the game with player
i and the game without player i. We then take the average
of this contribution over all possible different permutations in
which the coalition can be formed. The Shapley value satisfies
the following axioms [106], [107]:
• Joint efficiency: The total surplus of all players equals
that of the coalition, i.e.,
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N).
• Zero payoff to the dummy: A dummy player is the one
which does not contribute anything to the value of any
coalition that it joins, i.e., v(S∪ i) = v(S), for all S. The
payoff to the dummy player is zero.
• Symmetry: If two players have the same contribution, i.e.,
v(S ∪ i) = v(S ∪ j), they receive the same payoff.
• Additivity: The payoff of any player is equal to the sum
of all the payoffs that the player will receive as a member
of all possible coalitions.
It was shown in [108], [109] that the Shapley value given
in (7) is unique satisfying the four above axioms. This is
desirable from the perspective of cooperative providers. In
cloud networking, the Shapley value has been used for sharing
profit among cloud providers from their resource pooling.
Moreover, it has been also adopted for sharing the cost among
cloud users from using bandwidth [110] and for the fair profit
sharing among Internet service providers [111].
The summary of the above auctions along with their ap-
plications in cloud networking is given in Table III. As seen,
auction mechanisms have been used for resource management
in cloud networking. Moreover, the Vickrey auction, i.e., the
second-price sealed-bid auction, has been more frequently
used compared with the other auction mechanisms due to its
privacy and truthfulness guarantee [112].
5) Posted-price mechanism: The posted-price mechanism
is typically used in online procurement markets, e.g., a digital
market, in which sellers arrive in a sequential order. The
posted-price mechanism assigns a specific price to each seller
when the seller arrives. The seller can “take or leave” this
price. Typically, the seller accepts the price if its actual
cost is less than the price offered by the mechanism. The
seller then gives its buyers “take-it-or-leave-it” offer price,
meaning that a buyer can accept or reject the offer [113].
Based on the buyer’s responses, the mechanism will set prices
for subsequent sellers’ commodities. Since the posted-price
mechanism may set different prices for the same commodity,
it is similar to the differential pricing mechanism, i.e., the
price discrimination, as presented in Section III-A2. Thus,
the term “posted-price discrimination” sometimes appears
in the literature [114]. Besides, making a comparison with
the auction mechanisms, the posted-price mechanism is less
complex since it decides immediately an offer price without
soliciting an ask from each seller upon the seller’s arrival
[115]. In the context of cloud networking, the posted-price
mechanism has been used when resource sellers, e.g., users
in the social cloud, arrive in a sequential order to offer their
storage services. In commercial clouds, e.g., Amazon’s elastic
cloud compute (EC2), the cloud provider uses this mechanism
to post a certain price on the “take-it-or-leave-it” basis [116].
Extended to IoT, this mechanism has been also used for the
data aggregation in crowdsensing networks in which the data
sellers are phone users [117], [118].
C. Network Utility Maximization (NUM)-based pricing
In this section, we explain the Network Utility Maximiza-
tion (NUM), known as a dual-based distributed algorithm
for the resource allocation. NUM is essentially the problem
of maximizing the total utility of users in a network, given
the capacity constraint of the network [119]. The original
NUM problem only considers utility functions of users. In
the context of cloud networking, when users utilize resources
from a cloud provider, they incur a total cost to the cloud
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TABLE III
A SUMMARY OF KEY FEATURES AND SUITABLE SCENARIOS OF AUCTIONS USED IN CLOUD NETWORKING.
Auction type Market structure Key descriptions Suitable scenarios Solution
English auction
[93]
A seller, multiple
buyers, and an
auctioneer
Open-outcry ascending-price auction, and
winning buyer pays the second highest price
• Economics: seller’s revenue maximization
• Cloud networking: bandwidth allocation
Nash
equilibrium
Dutch auction [93]
A seller, multiple
buyers, and an
auctioneer
Open-outcry descending price auction, and
winning buyer pays the final price
• Economics: the best price guarantee for
buyer
• Cloud networking: bandwidth allocation
Nash
equilibrium
Vickrey
auction/second-
price sealed-bid
auction [95]
A seller, multiple
buyers, and an
auctioneer
Sealed-bid auction, and winning buyer pays the
second highest price
• Economics: buyer’s expected utility maxi-
mization
• Cloud networking: resource reservation,
task allocation, and storage sharing
Nash
equilibrium
VCG [98]
A seller, multiple
buyers, and an
auctioneer
A generation of the Vickrey auction for multiple
commodities, winning buyer pays a price equal
to the loss of the social value due to its getting
commodities
• Economics: social welfare maximization
• Cloud networking: bandwidth allocation
Bayesian Nash
equilibrium
Double auction
[99]
Multiple sellers,
multiple buyers, and an
auctioneer
Buyers and sellers submit respectively their bids
and asks, and the auctioneer matches asks and
bids
• Economics: ordinary markets with multiple
sellers and buyers which need to be cleared
• Cloud networking: bandwidth reservation,
resource sharing, and task allocation
Market
equilibrium
Combinatorial
auction [102]
A seller, multiple
buyers, and an
auctioneer
Buyers bid on combinations/packages of
commodities, and winner determination problem
is to find the optimal allocation of commodities.
• Economics: markets where buyers compete
on many different but related commodities
• Cloud networking: bandwidth allocation
Optimal
solution
provider. Therefore, the modified NUM problem which takes
into account the total cost should be investigated. Consider the
cloud resource reservation scenario in which N cloud tenants,
e.g., video content providers, reserve network bandwidth from
a cloud provider to deliver their videos to end-users. The goal
of the cloud provider is to maximize the social welfare. Thus,
the resource allocation problem can be expressed as
max
x
N∑
i
Ui(xi)− C(x) (8)
s.t. xi ∈ [ai, bi], i = 1, . . . , N,
where xi is the resource units that cloud tenant i receives,
x = (x1, . . . , xN ) is the vector of resource allocation, Ui(xi)
is the monotonically increasing utility function associated with
tenant i which is a strictly concave function of its resource
allocation, C(x) is a strictly convex function, and ai and bi
are the constants.
Since the cloud provider has no knowledge of the utility
functions, and the cost function is unknown to the cloud
tenants, centralized methods such as interior point methods
[120] which are typically applied to solve the NUM problems
may not be applicable to the specific problem in (8). Alterna-
tively, pricing-based iterative solutions are often used. Assume
that the cloud provider charges cloud tenant i a price pi for
using resource xi. Given a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pN ), the
problem in (8) is equivalent to
max
x∈Πi[ai,bi]
N∑
i
(Ui(xi)− pixi) + (p>x− C(x)), (9)
where (Ui(xi)−pixi) is the surplus of cloud tenant i for using
xi resource units, and (p>x−C(x)) is the profit of the cloud
provider. With the price vector p, each cloud tenant selects xi
resource units to maximize its surplus as follows:
xi(pi) = arg max
xi∈[ai,bi]
(Ui(xi)− pixi), i = 1, . . . , N. (10)
Given the returned resource request xi and applying the
dual decomposition and gradient methods, the cloud provider
updates iteratively the price vector p according to the rule:
pi = pi − γ(yi(p) − xi(pi)), where γ is an appropriate step
size, and yi(p) is taken from y(p) = (y1(p), . . . , yN (p)) =
arg max
xi∈[ai,bi]
p>x − C(x). The process is repeated until the
vector of resource allocation x converges to the optimal
resource allocation x∗. Since (8) is a convex optimization
problem, the solution x∗ is unique.
In practice, the above optimal solution is feasible only when
utility functions of cloud tenants are concave. However, in
delay-sensitive services, e.g., video and voice services, such
utility functions vary with different types of services with
inelastic flows. Therefore, the resource allocation may be a
non-convex optimization problem [121].
IV. APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS
FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD DATA CENTER
NETWORKING
Cloud networking provides local network connections to
servers [122] (Fig. 1) and remote links for data center to
create a resource pool supporting a large number of users
and applications with diverse resource demands and utilities.
Therefore, resource management becomes one of the most
important issues in cloud networking. This section reviews
applications of economic and pricing models for the resource
management in cloud data center networking. The major issues
include:
• Bandwidth allocation: Bandwidth allocation involves re-
serving and allocating bandwidth to users or applica-
tion service providers. Traditional bandwidth allocation
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algorithms often assume that the available resources do
not change. However, in cloud networking, resources and
demands can fluctuate randomly. Economic and pricing
models have been used as the solutions in which all
scarce resources can be best utilized with the variability
of budget.
• Request allocation: Request allocation is to assign mas-
sive users’ requests, e.g., the transaction and data process-
ing, to data centers. Economic and pricing models pro-
vide efficient approaches to achieve the load balancing,
latency and cost minimization taking network resource
availability into account.
• Workflow allocation: The workflow allocation in the
cloud data center networking is the computing task allo-
cation among the data centers. Market-based approaches
provide an efficient task assignment with the lowest cost
and the fastest completion time through using negotiation
mechanisms among network entities.
A. Bandwidth Allocation
As part of bandwidth allocation, the bandwidth reservation
can be implemented to guarantee the bandwidth availability
for users in future. This allows users to pay a lower price due
to advance reservation. However, the bandwidth reservation
may cause oversubscription or undersubsciption issues [123].
This section reviews the applications of economic and pricing
models for bandwidth reservation and allocation in cloud data
center networking. Note that the bandwidth reservation is
often implemented in advance compared with the bandwidth
allocation which is done in an online basis.
1) VCG auction: A typical bandwidth reservation model
in cloud networking is shown in Fig. 5. The model consists
of a cloud provider, i.e., a seller, which owns a number
of distributed data centers, and cloud tenants, i.e., buyers,
which act as application and service providers. Cloud tenants
rent bandwidth from the cloud provider to serve their sub-
scribers. To avoid the high bandwidth reservation payment,
the cloud tenants can lie about their revenues obtained by
serving subscribers. Therefore, the authors in [124] adopted
the VCG auction for the bandwidth reservation to achieve
both optimal social welfare and strategy-proofness [125] that
the cloud tenants have no incentive to lie about their revenue
information. The cloud tenants simultaneously submit their
bids to compete for bandwidth to the cloud provider. Each
bid consists of bandwidth demands and the price per unit of
bandwidth for which the buyer is willing to pay. To achieve
the highest social welfare for the allocation, the winners are
determined through a linear programming model which can
be solved in polynomial time. The VCG mechanism was
then applied to calculate the charge for each winner. The
charge is the difference between the social welfare when the
winner does not participate and when the winner participates
in the auction. Since the proposed approach has an optimal
allocation and calculates the charge based on the VCG auction,
it was concluded to be a strategy-proof and optimal auction
mechanism for cloud bandwidth reservation. The simulation
results showed that both the social welfare and the bandwidth
satisfaction ratio of the proposed approach exceed 90% of
the optimal solution when there are 200 tenants with 15 data
centers.
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Fig. 5. A market based cloud bandwidth reservation in cloud data center
networks.
2) Shapley value based auction: The VCG mechanism
mentioned in [124] can simultaneously guarantee the truth-
fulness and the optimal economic efficiency. However, when
the underlying allocation problem is NP-hard, e.g., the traffic
scheduling, the VCG auction becomes computationally in-
tractable. Approximation algorithms can be used, but they
cause the VCG auction to lose its truthfulness [126]. To
guarantee the truthfulness, approximation algorithms can be
combined with suitable rules, e.g., by exploiting critical bids
[127] or resorting to the linear programming decomposition
technique [128]. In the context of bandwidth allocation for
cloud users, the authors in [129] used the Shapley value
method as the payment strategy instead of the VCG rule. In
the auction, once receiving the data transfer requests (bids)
from users, i.e., buyers, the cloud provider calculates a feasible
traffic schedule to maximize social welfare based on linear
programming. The Shapley value of each user is calculated
as the average marginal charge by the cloud provider incurred
by the user’s traffic. Then, the cloud provider decides to reject
or accept a user’s request by comparing the user’s bid price
and its Shapley value. For example, if the user’s bid price is
larger than its Shapley value, the user’s request is accepted,
and its payment is equal to its Shapley value. Through the
idea of cost sharing, the Shapley value approach was proved
to be computationally efficient, budget balanced, individually
rational, and truthful. However, the proposed approach only
introduced the price. Other dimensions, e.g., path selection,
need to be considered for each transfer task.
3) Sealed-bid uniform price auction: The above approaches
only considered either bandwidth reservation [124] or band-
width allocation [129]. The authors in [130] addressed both
of them jointly through a two-tier pricing model with the
aim of allocating efficiently bandwidth and maximizing the
cloud provider’s revenue. In the first tier, the reservation phase
uses a premium price strategy to guarantee cloud tenants’
minimum bandwidth ahead in time. A premium price, also
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called image pricing, is a strategy of keeping the price of
a product or service artificially high to encourage favorable
perception among buyers [131]. The unallocated bandwidth
remained from the reservation phase is traded in the second
tier through a sealed-bid uniform price auction. The sealed-
bid uniform price auction is a multiunit auction where a fixed
number of identical units of a homogeneous commodity are
set at the same price. The uniform price auction is applied
due to its fairness in charging identical price for identical
goods. In a single auction round in the second tier, the cloud
provider formulates allocation functions based on the tenants’
demand requests and bidding prices. Then, the cloud provider
determines the market clearing price and allocates bandwidth
based on these allocation functions. Finally, all winners pay the
market clearing price for their respective allocated quantities.
However, the proposed approach did not consider the future
demands and the uncertainty in resource utilization of the
reservation requests.
4) Bargaining game: The aforementioned auctions only
satisfy either the buyer’s or the seller’s objective. To get a
win-win solution for both, a cooperative game such as a
bargaining game can be used. The authors in [132], [133]
employed the bargaining game to address the rate allocation
for VM-pairs in data centers as shown in Fig. 6. The VM-
pairs, i.e., buyers, participate in an iterative bargaining game
to negotiate the rates with the servers, i.e., sellers. Each VM-
pair is associated with a utility gain which is assumed to be
a convex function. The optimization problem is formulated to
maximize the joint profit which is the product of buyers’ utility
gains. The problem is solved by the dual-based decomposition
with the Lagrange multiplier method with the interpretation
of rates and prices that buyers are willing to pay. The rate
constraints are assumed to be linear [134]. Using the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [135], the approach achieves
a unique Nash bargaining solution of the rate allocation. The
Nash bargaining solution ensures the Pareto optimality and
achieves the fairness in resource allocation [136], [137]. The
simulation results showed that the proposed approach can
satisfy bandwidth demands of VM-pairs up to 99%. However,
using the subgradient method results in slow convergence
speed.
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Fig. 6. A Nash bargaining game based rate allocation in cloud data center
networks.
5) Stackelberg game: Auction approaches, e.g., sealed-bid
auctions, allow the cloud provider to determine the price of
bandwidth based on their bids. Typically, the cloud provider
sets the bandwidth price to maximize its own revenue, and then
the tenants decide their payments to obtain more bandwidth
without paying too much. Thus, the interactions between the
cloud providers and tenants can be modeled as a two-stage
Stackelberg game as proposed in [138]. In the first stage,
based on tenants’ bandwidth demands, the cloud providers,
i.e., leaders, cooperate with each other in a Nash bargaining
game to optimize their pricing strategies. Different from [132],
[134] which employed the subgradient method, found to have
slow convergence to the optimal price, the authors in [138]
proposed to combine the advantage of the demand segmen-
tation method and the geometrical Nash bargaining solution
[139]. Given the price and the amount of bandwidth that the
cloud providers are willing to allocate, each selfish tenant,
i.e., a follower, optimizes its bandwidth reservation through
the weighted fair and max-min fair bandwidth reservation
algorithms. The simulation results indicated that the proposed
algorithms ensure the high average revenue of cloud providers
and guarantee the bandwidth requirement for tenants.
In practice, the tenants’ VMs of the same applications in a
data center can be partitioned into the same virtual networks
through network slicing [140]. The authors in [33], [141]
adopted the Stackelberg game for allocating bandwidth to the
tenants’ virtual networks from the cloud provider. The cloud
provider acts as the leader which announces a rental price per
unit of bandwidth. Unlike [138], the leader’s pricing strategy
attempts to drive tenants’ virtual networks, i.e., followers, to
the social optimal solution and to make the highest profit
for itself simultaneously. Due to the non-cooperative nature
in terms of demand for network resources, virtual networks
can be considered to be players in a non-cooperative game
in which their strategies are to choose bandwidth demands
to maximize their own utilities. Assume that the utilities are
strictly concave functions of bandwidth and additive, the opti-
mal bandwidth allocation among followers can be formulated
as an optimization problem with multiple constraints. Through
the distributed implementation, it was proved that the problem
has a unique optimal solution which is the Nash equilibrium of
the game. Given the set of optimal strategies of the followers,
the leader then defines an objective function to be its own
profit. Optimizing this function using the first-order conditions,
there exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the
leader’s profit is maximized, and the bandwidth allocation for
the followers reaches the Nash equilibrium [33]. Theoretically,
the outcome of the Stackelberg game can achieve the better
utilities compared with Nash equilibrium strategies which
are obtained by assuming a simultaneous choice for leaders
and the follower [142]. However, the experiment results to
demonstrate this important comparison were not given.
6) Differential pricing: As stated earlier, the differential
pricing applies different prices of the same product to different
buyers. The authors in [59], [143] adopted the differential
pricing for the allocation of bandwidth to tenants with the
aim of maximizing the cloud provider’s revenue. Specifically,
the tenants, i.e., buyers, submit their requests to the cloud
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provider, i.e., the seller. Each request has a bandwidth demand
and a deviation factor. The deviation factor represents the
flexibility in bandwidth allocation available to the provider.
If two requests have different deviation factors, the tenant
with a higher value gives higher flexibility to the provider
than that with a lower value. The cloud provider gives more
discounts, i.e., a lower price, to the tenant with the higher
deviation factor. This flexibility introduces more degree of
freedom of bandwidth allocation, leading to a higher effi-
ciency. Simulation results showed that compared with the
deterministic bandwidth allocation algorithm from [144], the
proposed approach increases the allocated bandwidth up to
28% and the provider’s revenue up to 12%. However, as shown
in [145], the difference of the provider’s revenue between the
two approaches is slight when more discounts are given.
7) Smart data pricing: Smart data pricing adapts the re-
source price according to network congestion. This pricing
strategy is used to create proper economic incentives for
users. The authors in [146] adopted this strategy for allocating
communication bandwidth to tenants’ VMs when the VMs
communicate with each other via multiple links as shown in
Fig. 1. The objectives are to achieve the min-guarantee, i.e.,
guaranteeing the minimum bandwidth that the tenants expect
for each VM, high utilization, i.e., maximizing network uti-
lization, and network proportionality, i.e., the fairness among
tenants. The experimental results showed that the proposed
approach can satisfy up to 98% of tenants’ VM demand
compared with 76% of the baseline pricing from [147] which
sets price based on only bandwidth. However, the proposed
approach does not explain how to set the unit price of the
min-guarantee bandwidth optimally.
The schemes to calculate the unit price of the min-guarantee
bandwidth can be found in [148], [149]. The price is pro-
portional to the number of serving VMs and is inversely
proportional to the total sharing bandwidth. However, this
pricing strategy is simple and does not ensure that the price
is optimal.
8) Other pricing models: Apart from the common schemes
described above, others pricing models have also been applied
to the resource allocation in cloud networking.
Dominant resource pricing: Typically, cloud tenants rent
both VM and network resource, i.e., a data transfer service.
Therefore, the price that a tenant pays the data center owner,
i.e., a cloud provider, depends on the time of VM occupancy
and the size of the data transferred among VMs. In particular,
the time of the VM occupancy depends on the location of
the tenant because if the tenant is far from VMs’ locations,
the transfer time is longer. The authors in [150], [151],
[152] proposed dominant resource pricing that applies prices
independently of the tenants’ locations, and thus reducing the
tenants’ costs. Since only the VM occupancy price depends on
the tenant’s location, the key technique is to enable the network
price to dominate the VM occupancy price. Since the network
price can be larger or smaller than the VM occupancy price,
a bandwidth baseband threshold was introduced to guarantee
that the bandwidth requirement is always larger than the base
bandwidth. Therefore, the network price always dominates the
VM occupancy price, and the tenants’ payments are considered
to be flat, i.e., a location independent price. The simulation
results showed that compared with the baseline pricing which
sets price based on the task completion time, the tenants pay
70-80% less with the proposed pricing. However, the proposed
approach does not specify how to set the bandwidth baseband
threshold optimally.
Ramsey pricing: The authors in [66] exploited the Ram-
sey pricing [153] to regulate the demand of cloud tenants’
bandwidth requests, achieving higher network utilization. The
model consists of a cloud provider which owns a number of
geographically distributed data centers connected with each
other through a high-capacity network. Each virtual link
between any two data centers is divided into several virtual
pipes corresponding to several service classes. Each service
class has a specific expected latency and a corresponding
price which is set based on the Ramsey problem. The Ramsey
problem pricing is a strategy in which a monopolist sets the
price to maximize social welfare subject to the constraint on
profit [154]. Applying this strategy to the proposed model,
the price is set to maximize the welfare of both the cloud
tenants and the cloud provider subject to the preset profit
threshold. Solving this problem requires to have knowledge of
the profit threshold and the expected demand for each service
class. The threshold can be defined according to the market
competition, and the expected demand can be obtained by
cloud resource monitoring methods, e.g., a semi-centralized
monitoring mechanism [155]. Generally, increasing the price
leads to a decrease in the demand of that service class, or it will
move the demand of that service class to other classes. The
simulation results showed that the cloud provider’s network
utilization of the proposed approach is higher, e.g., 60% with
the supply and demand pricing [156] or 40% with the static
pricing. However, multiple cloud providers participating in the
market need to be considered in the future work.
Pricing model based on dynamic programming: The
above approaches did not consider the workload fluctuation
of cloud tenants. Some events, e.g., releasing of a new movie,
cause a high workload fluctuation. These applications require
a continuous resource allocation elasticity to accurately adapt
to the time-varying application’s needs [157]. Therefore, it
is important to predict the workload fluctuation. The authors
in [158] proposed an approach to tackle this problem. The
model consists of a cloud application owner, i.e., a buyer,
which rents the inter-data center networking resources from a
service provider, i.e., a seller. The application’s requirements
can be predicted by using a Markov chain model, utilizing
the temporal variability of workload fluctuations [159]. The
prediction allows the service provider to dynamically re-size
the inter-data centers bandwidth pool to ensure the availability
of network resources. Given the traffic workload fluctuation
information, the service provider sets the resource prices at
each time slot to maximize its long-term expected revenue. A
dynamic programming algorithm [160] was adopted to search
for the optimal prices. The simulation results showed that
the mean square error between the estimated and the actual
fluctuations can be marginal. Moreover, when the elasticity
level, i.e., the bandwidth adaptation, is higher, the service
provider receives a higher accumulated revenue since more
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bandwidth demands are met at a higher price. However, more
advanced techniques should be applied to accurately forecast
workload fluctuations.
B. Request Allocation
The term “request” in this section represents the re-
source/workload/data processing requests from cloud users or
tenants. A simple technique can be implemented by assigning
each request of a user to the closest data center [161].
However, such a method can overload the data center during
peak time and further degrade application performance as
well as the revenue of the provider. Therefore, economic and
pricing models have been developed to optimize the benefits
of users and providers.
1) Cost-based pricing: To maximize the service provider’s
profit while satisfying Service-Level Agreements (SLAs) of
the users, the authors in [162] considered charging incom-
ing user requests through the cost-based pricing. Cost-based
pricing is a strategy to set the price of a request based on
the cost of executing the request. In particular, whenever
a new request from a user arrives at the cloud site, the
service provider, i.e., the seller, estimates necessary parameters
including network parameters (e.g., the bandwidth, control
overhead, session throughput, and session lifetime), resource
parameters (average inflow and processing speed), and data
processing parameters (e.g., a job size, block size, and total
time). These parameters allow the service provider to deter-
mine the SLA of the user and the resources allocated for the
request. Then, the price of the request is defined according
to the costs of resources. To maximize the service provider’s
profit, the consumer perceive pricing is also employed through
considering the money for which the user is willing to pay.
However, other market factors, e.g., the market competition,
need to be considered.
2) Bargaining game: To direct the users’ requests to the
appropriate data centers, mapping nodes, e.g., authoritative
DNS servers, can be deployed at different regions. The ob-
jective of this deployment is to optimize the general system
performance. The mapping nodes cooperate for receiving the
cloud resources from data centers. The authors in [85] modeled
the data selection problem for users’ requests as the bargaining
game among mapping nodes. Each mapping node, i.e., a
player, has its own average utility as the objective which
can be a convex function of the latency or throughput. Each
node also has an initial utility which represents the minimum
utility requirement for the users based on the SLAs with the
cloud provider. The goal is to maximize the average utility
cooperatively. Similar to [132], the optimization problem is
formulated by maximizing the joint utility which is the product
of nodes’ average utilities. However, unlike [132], to solve
the non-linear problem, the sequential-linear-approximation
algorithm [163] was employed for reducing computational
complexity. The linear problem is then solved by the dual-
based decomposition with the Lagrange multiplier method
with the interpretation of load balancing, capacity, and cost
constraints. Using the subgradient method, the load balancing
and capacity constraints from data centers serve as price sig-
nals. When the total traffic routed to a data center exceeds its
capacity, the data center increases its price for the next round to
suppress the excessive demand. This process continues until
the algorithm converges to the optimal resource allocation.
However, the slow convergence from using the subgradient
method can impact the real-time applications.
3) Non-cooperative game: In a competition market with
multiple service providers, a non-cooperative game can be
used. The authors in [164] adopted the game for the request al-
location among service providers with the aim of maximizing
the social welfare of the system. The market consists of service
providers, i.e., sellers, and a user, i.e., a buyer. Each service
provider has its own control strategy which involves deciding
on the number of servers placed in each data center and
routing a user’s request to an appropriate server. The objective
of each service provider is to minimize its operational costs
while satisfying the users’ SLA and data center capacity
constraints. Assume that each service provider’s strategy is
kept private from other service providers. The set of optimal
strategies yields a unique Nash equilibrium in which no service
provider can optimize its cost by unilaterally changing its
allocation strategy over time. The price of anarchy and the
price of stability are then determined as the metrics to measure
the best-case and worst-case efficiency loss of the game,
respectively.
To tackle the worst-case where a service provider behaves
selfishly in an uncoordinated manner, the authors in [165]
extended the market with the participation of the cloud
provider by taking into account a penalty function. The cloud
provider must pay a penalty cost for the service provider
when the cloud provider rejects the resource request from
the service providers. This is reasonable since the request
rejection can hurt the service satisfaction of users, resulting
in the loss in service provider’s revenue. The experimental
results showed that the proposed approach can improve the
social welfare from 10% to 20% compared with the outcome
of the competition game in [164].
C. Workflow Allocation
Workflow allocation in cloud network is to map required
tasks from users to the resources at multiple network lo-
cations and order their executions so that task-precedence
requirements are satisfied [166]. Due to the large resource
distribution in the cloud network, the requirements for the
workload allocation include minimizing the cost and delay
of the task execution as well as adapting dynamically to
the resource demand fluctuation from users. The traditional
approaches exploited the diversity in local electricity prices,
e.g., [167], [168], [169]. However, they focused only on
minimizing the cost, i.e., Operational expenditures (Opex),
of the operators rather than satisfying the users. Besides,
the static approaches, e.g., [170], [171], may not achieve the
objectives due to the lack of interactions among the entities
in the cloud network. Therefore, the market based schemes
with negotiation mechanisms among network entities have
been developed to optimize the workflow allocation, resource
utilization, and profit of the operators.
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1) Profit maximization: The authors in [172] proposed a
task scheduling algorithm across data centers through the
economic model based on profit maximization as described in
Section III-A3. Once receiving workload requests from users
including the types of VMs and the number of time slots, the
cloud provider solves the profit maximization problem. The
total revenue depends on the number of tasks and their prices,
and the costs are the Opex in the data center. The solution of
the optimization problem allows the cloud provider to choose
(i) an appropriate price for each type of tasks at each data
center, (ii) the best number of servers to provision each type
of VMs in each data center, and (iii) the optimal number of
tasks of each type to schedule and to drop. Moreover, to enable
the cloud provider to achieve a high time-average overall
profit, the authors adopted the drift-plus-penalty framework
in Lyapunov optimization [173]. It is a classical approach
for translating a long-term time-average optimization problem
into a series of similar one-shot optimization problems. The
simulation results showed that the proposed pricing algorithm
outperforms the static pricing, e.g., the pricing strategy in
Amazon EC2’s on-demand instance market, in terms of the
profit. Moreover, the proposed approach achieves the stable
profit over time.
2) Spot instance pricing: The approach in [172] aims
at maximizing the cloud provider’s profit. To reduce costs
for users and achieve high utilization, the spot instance
pricing can be used. Spot instance pricing which is prac-
tically used to set the price of the Amazon EC2 instances
(https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/spot/pricing/) allows users to bid
for idle or unused cloud instances. The users receive the
instances immediately as long as their bids are higher than the
spot price (i.e., the price of the spot instance) [174], which
is often a discounted price. Different from the auction ap-
proaches, e.g., the first-price sealed-bid auction, the user only
pays the spot price instead of its bidding price. The authors
in [175] addressed the workload scheduling in cloud networks
by combining the spot instance pricing and the on-demand
instance pricing [176] to reduce the cost of workload execution
while guaranteeing the workflow deadline. The model is shown
in Fig. 7. Each user submits its bid to the task scheduler includ-
ing the application task, current spot price, on-demand price,
the current time, and factors that specify the weights of the
types of pricing. The scheduler calculates the bid values and
employs the checkpointing technique [177] which is known
as an efficient fault tolerant strategy to find a suitable cloud
resource for every task. If the spot instance is not enough for
accomplishing the task, the scheduler adaptively switches to
on-demand instances to meet workflow deadline. Experimental
results showed that the proposed approach can reduce up
to 70% execution cost compared with the task scheduling
algorithm using only the on-demand instance pricing.
D. Applications of economic and pricing models for resource
management in federated cloud networking
To guarantee SLAs for users’ composite services, i.e., multi-
cloud applications, cloud and network resources need to be
distributed across multiple cloud providers [178]. Federated
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Fig. 7. Spot instance pricing based workflow allocation mechanism.
cloud networking (Fig. 8) enables interconnecting the cloud
providers to form cloud federation resources which can be
shared to increase capacity, availability, and resilience at
multiple network locations [179]. The federated cloud network
can be considered to be an extension of the cloud data center
network belonging to the providers. Mathematically, it was
also proved in [180] that the Return On Investment (ROI),
i.e., the earned amount of money for each unit of investment,
of a cloud provider in the federated cloud networking is higher
than that in the stand-alone cloud data center network. In
what follows, we discuss economic and pricing models which
provide incentives to cloud providers to pool their resources
in the federated cloud network to satisfy users’ requests.
1) Profit maximization: To stimulate cloud providers within
the federated cloud network for sharing resources, their profits
need to be maximized. Therefore, the authors in [63] adopted
the economic model based on profit maximization for allocat-
ing resource requests from users to cloud providers in a fed-
erated cloud network. The model consists of cloud providers
interconnected through high capacity links. As shown in Fig. 8,
each cloud provider receives resource requests from its local
users and other providers. A cloud provider can insource,
i.e., rent out, its unused resources to serve other providers,
but it can also outsource, i.e., borrow, resources from other
providers. To maximize cloud providers’ profits and guarantee
load balancing among them, each cloud provider determines
the insourcing price as well as the available quota of resources.
Using pricing policy proposed in [181], the insourcing price
is set according to the VM costs, the fixed price to local
users, and the maximum hosting capacity and idle capacity.
Given the insourcing price, outsourcing prices (set by other
providers), and networking costs (from the network providers),
each provider solves the integer linear programming problem
with the aim of maximizing the total profit of the providers
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in the federated cloud network. The solution of this problem
helps each provider to partition received requests into subsets
that will be hosted locally or outsourced to other providers as
well as to select the insourcing requests from other providers to
accept. The simulation results showed that compared with the
case without federation, the proposed approach can improve
the profits of some providers up to 42% and the request
acceptance rate up to 48%.
The approach in [63] did not specify how to set the resource
prices. The authors in [182] determined upper and lower
bounds for resource prices for both cloud providers and users.
The model is shown in Fig. 9. First, each cloud provider
calculates costs, e.g., energy costs, networking costs, deploy-
ment costs, and outsourcing costs. The lower bound for the
insourcing price charging to the other providers is determined
based on the condition to ensure that the revenue is higher than
the overall cost. The upper bound for the insourcing price is
obtained based on the proposed insourcing prices by the other
providers, and particularly the upper bound is the minimum
insourcing price among them. This enables one cloud provider
to compete with the other cloud providers. Otherwise, the
proposed resource price to users needs to be higher than
the insourcing price to improve revenues of the providers
within the federated cloud network. This condition allows
to determine the lower and upper bounds for the proposed
price to the users. These lower and upper bound prices are
used as inputs for the revenue maximization problem of each
cloud provider. The branch and bound algorithm [183] is used
to solve the integer problem to find the optimal resource
amount for serving the users, the amount for outsourcing and
for insourcing. Nonetheless, the low complexity algorithm is
needed.
The same approach can be found in [184] which determines
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a portion of job requests transferred from one provider to the
other provider so that their total profit is maximized while
guaranteeing the user utility. The model consists of two cloud
service providers and their servers interconnected with each
other through Internet links. First, each provider defines a
profit function of its revenue and energy consumption cost.
The revenue is based on the total incoming requests at the
queue of the provider and the price per request. The total
request of a provider includes the requests from its local users
and the other provider’s users. The price per request is set
based on a QoS-dependent pricing scheme which should be
convex and decreasing in the average delay of job execution.
This delay is calculated according to the M/M/1 queueing
model [185], taking into account the Internet transfer delay.
The total profit maximization of the two providers is a non-
linear optimization problem that is then solved with the
method of Lagrangian and the KKT conditions. The solution
is the optimal portions of the requests at each provider to
be routed to the other provider [135]. The simulation results
indicated that the proposed approach improves the total profit
up to 100% compared with the case when each provider serves
only its own users. However, the case with more than two
providers that will make the problem more general was not
considered.
2) Differential pricing: The aforementioned approaches did
not provide any prediction techniques which address the work-
load elasticity of users. The future resource consumption of
current users in the federated cloud network can be estimated
through their behavior and probability of using the resource
as proposed in [186], [187]. The resources considered here
include virtual servers, computing and storage resources, vir-
tual networks, and network bandwidth. The prediction can be
implemented by a cloud broker which acts as an intermediary
between the cloud providers and users. Basically, the resource
estimation for the current user is based on the current resource
price, the average of service relinquishing probability, and the
history of relinquishing probability of the user. Relinquishing
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probability of a user is the probability of giving up the resource
for which the user has requested. Given the relinquishing
probability, the differential pricing scheme was introduced
to set different resource prices depending on the behavior
of users [187]. Specifically, the proposed resource price is
proportional to the service relinquishing probability of the user.
For example, if the user has the high probability, the proposed
price is set at a high value. This policy discourages the users
with a high relinquishing probability from participating in
the market because they may degrade the profit of providers.
However, the proposed approach did not explain how to obtain
the relinquishing probability for each user.
The same approach can be found in [188]. However, the au-
thors in [188] investigated refunding the remaining amount to
a user when its service consumption will be discontinued. The
authors also considered that fog computing which is located
between underlying Internet of Things (IoT) devices and the
cloud computing can implement this task. The total refund is
the sum of the refund of unutilized resources and the refund
to be paid on quality degradation, i.e., not satisfying SLA.
The refund is determined based on the amount of unutilized
resources and a depreciation index. A high depreciation index
allows the users which have used more services, e.g., more
than 60%, to receive more refunds. The refund on quality
degradation is based on the ratio of the acquired quality of
service and the provided QoS.
3) Cost-based pricing: In the federated cloud network,
users have to decide where to place their services on the
federated cloud such that the service cost is minimized. The
authors in [189] addressed the service placement optimiza-
tion based on the cost model in federated hybrid clouds to
guarantee the cost minimization for cloud users. A federated
hybrid cloud (Fig. 10) is a composition of interoperable private
and public cloud networks. Given a set of cloud services
from the cloud providers, the total cost for each possible
service placement option is evaluated by calculating the sum
of the fixed costs and the variable costs. The fixed costs
include the costs for hardware, e.g., servers and network
devices, and software licenses. The variable costs comprise,
e.g., the electricity cost, Internet connectivity cost, and cost
of data transfer between different clouds. Finally, the cloud
user selects the best option which has the minimum total cost.
However, more performance factors, e.g., a service latency,
need to be considered to guarantee user SLAs.
4) Double auction: Most of the above approaches consider
the request allocation. The authors in [190] addressed the
bandwidth reservation in federated cloud networking by using
the double auction. The model consists of multiple cloud
providers, i.e., sellers, multiple cloud tenants, i.e., buyers, and
an auctioneer. The double auction used in this work is similar
to that presented in Section III-B4. However, there are some
slight modifications in the winner determination and payment
stages. Specifically, upon receiving asks from sellers and bids
from buyers, the auctioneer sorts sellers in the first list by the
selling prices in a non-decreasing order. Then, the auctioneer
sorts buyers in the second list by their bids in a non-increasing
order. The water filling method [191] is used to fill the sellers
one by one following the order in the first list, with buyers by
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Fig. 10. Service placement in hybrid federated cloud network.
the order in the second list. The auctioneer finds the largest
indexes k and l in the two lists to satisfy two constraints: (i)
the first k sellers in the first list have sufficient bandwidth to
satisfy the demands of the first l buyers in the second list,
and (ii) the total charge to l buyers is less than total payment
to k sellers. The second constraint is to guarantee the ex-post
budget balance of the auction, i.e., the profit of the auctioneer
is non-negative. The winners are the first k sellers and the
first l buyers. The auctioneer pays each winning seller by the
(k+1)th selling price in the first list and charges each winning
buyer by the (l + 1)th bidding price in the second list. Such
payment and charging mechanisms are similar to those of the
Vickrey auction that guarantee the truthfulness of the auction.
However, the cheating behaviors of the bidders such as false-
name bidding and collusion need to be considered in the future
work.
Summary: In this section, we have discussed three major
issues in cloud data center networks, i.e., the bandwidth
allocation, request allocation, and workload allocation. We
have then reviewed the applications of economic and pricing
models for these issues which are summarized along with
references in Table IV and Table V. We observe that in the
cloud data center networking, economic and pricing models for
bandwidth allocation get more attentions than other issues. In
the federated cloud networking, the models aim at improving
the total profit for cloud providers. In the next section, we re-
view economic and pricing models in mobile cloud networking
for efficient management of cloud and radio resources.
V. APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS
FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN MOBILE CLOUD
NETWORKING
As stated in Section II, the Mobile Cloud Networking
(MCN) is structured by several segments including cloud
computing infrastructures (i.e., data centers), Radio Access
Network (RAN), cloud mobile core network, and mobile
platform services [26]. Since the wireless environment in
MCN is dynamic, distributed, and heterogeneous, traditional
static methods are not possible to adapt to achieve optimal
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TABLE IV
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD DATA CENTER NETWORKING
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
B
an
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id
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al
lo
ca
tio
n
[124] VCG auction
Cloud
provider
Cloud
tenants Bandwidth
Based on buyers’ bids, the seller determines
winners by solving a linear program in
polynomial time and charges each winner with
the VCG payment
Resource efficiency,
and welfare social
maximization
Nash
equilibrium
[129]
Shapley value
based auction
Cloud
provider
Cloud
users Bandwidth
Based on buyers’ bids, the seller compares each
buyer’s price with its own Shapley value to
accept or reject the buyer. The accepted buyers
pay their Shapley values for the seller
Social welfare
maximization,
computational efficient,
individually rational,
and truthful
Nash
equilibrium
[130]
Premium price
and sealed-bid
uniform price
auction
Cloud
provider Users Bandwidth
Buyers reserve bandwidth based on the premium
pricing. The unallocated bandwidth remaining is
traded using the sealed-bid uniform price auction
Maximum social
welfare, and revenue
maximization
Nash
equilibrium
[132]
[134]
[133]
Bargaining
game Servers VM-pairs
Transmission
rate
The unique optimal solution for the rate and
price is determined by using the method of
Lagrange multipliers and the karush-kuhn-tucker
conditions
Min-bandwidth
guarantee, high
utilization, and fair
allocation
Nash
bargaining
solution
[138]
Stackelberg
game
Cloud
provider
Application
provider Bandwidth
Sellers set the bandwidth price based on the
geometrical Nash bargaining game. The buyer
optimizes its bandwidth reservation through the
weighted fair and max-min fair reservation
algorithms
High revenue, and
bandwidth guarantee
Stackelberg
equilibrium
solution
[33]
[141]
Stackelberg
game
Cloud
provider
Tenants’
virtual
networks
Bandwidth
Seller uses the first-order conditions to set price,
and buyers compete the bandwidth in a
non-cooperative game
Efficient and fair
allocation, and seller’s
profit maximization
Stackelberg
equilibrium
solution
[59]
[143]
Differential
pricing
Cloud
provider Tenants Bandwidth
Seller sets lower prices for buyers which accept
to receive bandwidth allocation with high
flexibility
Payment minimization,
and high utilization
Pareto
efficiency
[146]
Smart data
pricing
Cloud
provider
Tenants’
VMs Bandwidth
Seller sets price of links between VMs
depending on the congestion degree of the links
to regulate VMs’ demands
Min-bandwidth
guarantee, high
utilization, and network
proportionality
Market
equilibrium
[148]
[149]
Smart data
pricing
Cloud
provider
Tenants’
VMs Bandwidth
Same as [146], but the seller sets price of
bandwith reservation according to the number of
serving VMs, and the total sharing bandwidth
Min-bandwidth
guarantee, high
utilization
Market
equilibrium
[150]
[151]
Dominant
resource
pricing
Cloud
provider
Cloud
tenants
Data
transfer
service
Seller introduces a bandwidth threshold which
the buyers must buy so that the network price
dominates the VM occupancy price
Min-bandwidth
guarantee, buyers’ cost
reduction
Flat-rate
equilibrium
[66] Ramsey pricing
Cloud
provider
Cloud
tenants Bandwidth
Seller sets different prices for different virtual
pipes based on Ramsey problem
High utilization, social
welfare maximization
Second-
best
equilibrium
[158]
Dynamic
programming
based pricing
Service
provider
Application
provider Bandwidth
Seller predicts the buyer’s needs using a Markov
chain and sets price for the network resource
based on a dynamic programming algorithm
High resource
adaptation, and high
revenue
Optimal
solution
W
or
kl
oa
d
al
lo
ca
tio
n
[172]
Profit
maximization
Cloud
provider Users Workload
Once receiving workload requests from buyers,
the seller solves the profit maximization through
the drift-plus-penalty framework in the Lyapunov
optimization
Time-averaged overall
profit maximization,
and optimal accepted
tasks
Optimal
solution
[175] Spot instance
Cloud
provider User Workload
Seller employs the checkpointing technique for
scheduling the buyer’s workload. The buyer pays
the seller the spot instance
Buyer’s cost
minimization
Spot
market
equilibrium
resource management [19]. Economic and pricing models have
been recently employed to dynamically and efficiently manage
resources, e.g., the bandwidth and energy, in MCN, which are
reviewed in the following.
A. Bandwidth Allocation
In this section, we review dynamic pricing schemes using
auction mechanisms to address bandwidth allocation issues in
MCN.
1) Combinatorial clock auction: The authors in [192] stud-
ied the method to assign efficiently wireless bandwidth to
cloud users in MCN. The cloud users typically reserve the
bandwidth for both uplink and downlink transmission within
a specific time period. Thus, the combinatorial clock auction
which is described in Section III-B4 is applied. The model
consists of a mobile cloud network owner which acts as a seller
(auctioneer), and cloud users which act as buyers (bidders).
The auctioneer owns a set of spectrum bands. Each band may
have several bandwidth channels. The channels are auctioned
within a specified time period and location. Bidders submit
their package bids to the auctioneer. Each bid is a combination
of channels in different bands, locations, and time periods
and the corresponding price for which the bidder is willing
to pay. The winner determination problem was formulated
to identify the bids as winning or losing. The objective is
to maximize the sum of the accepted bidding prices. The
constraints include spectrum availability and duplex spacing
between the uplink and downlink spectrum channels, i.e.,
paired spectrum channels. In particular, the duplex spacing
constraint is to avoid the interference between the uplink and
downlink channels. The spacing can be the amount of unpaired
spectrum allocated to the bidder. The winner determination
problem is NP-hard, and the anytime search algorithm [193]
can be used which leads to a feasible solution at any time
for the bandwidth allocation. However, the joint allocation of
bandwidth and other network resources, e.g., base stations and
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TABLE V
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD DATA CENTER NETWORKING (CONT.)
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
R
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n
[162]
Cost-based
pricing
Service
provider User
Request
execution
Seller sets price of the request execution based
on the total cost of resources
Seller’s profit
maximization
Pareto
efficiency
[85]
Bargaining
game
Data
centers
Mapping
nodes
Request
directing
service
A bargaining game among buyers is solved by
the dual decomposition with the Lagrange
multipliers. The balancing and capacity act as
price signals to regulate the buyers’ needs
Social welfare
maximization
Nash
bargaining
equilibrium
[164]
Non-
cooperative
game
Cloud
provider
Service
providers
Request
execution
Sellers participate in the non-cooperative game in
which their strategies are to decide the number
of servers placed in each data center and routing
users’ requests to appropriate servers
Social welfare
maximization
Nash
equilibrium
[165]
Non-
cooperative
game
Cloud
provider
Service
providers
Request
execution
Same as [164], but sellers will receive a penalty
cost if the cloud provider rejects the buyers’
resource demands
Social welfare
maximization
Nash
equilibrium
[63]
Profit
maximization
Cloud
providers Users
Resource
requests
Each seller sets resource insourcing price to
other sellers based on its maximum hosting
capacity and idle capacity. Maximizing total
profit of federation providers is solved via the
integer linear problem
Profit maximization Optimalsolution
[182]
Profit
maximization
Cloud
providers Users
Resource
requests
Each seller proposes upper and lower bounds for
resource prices to other sellers and buyers. Then,
the branch and bound algorithm is used to
determine optimal resource allocation
Profit maximization,
and optimal request
allocation
Optimal
solution
[186]
[187]
Differential
pricing
Cloud
providers Users
Service
requests
A broker considers behaviors of buyers through
defining their relinquishing probabilities to set
different prices
Efficient resource
allocation, and profit
improvement
Pareto
efficiency
[189]
Cost-based
pricing
Cloud
providers
Cloud
user
Service
requests
Buyer evaluates the total cost of all possible
resource options for its service execution from
different sellers through calculating fixed costs
and variable costs. The option with minimum
total cost is selected
Buyer’s cost
minimization
Pareto
efficiency
[190] Double auction
Cloud
providers
Cloud
tenants Bandwidth
The auctioneer uses the water filling method to
select the winning buyers and winning sellers.
The charing and payment policies are based on
the Vicrkey auction
Truthfulness, and
ex-post budget balance
Market
equilibrium
backhaul links, needs to be investigated.
2) Conventional auction: The auction mechanism as pro-
posed in [192] requires a high communication overhead.
Alternatively, the Dutch auction (see Section III-B4) can be
used for the bandwidth redistribution as proposed in [194]. The
model is shown in Fig. 11 in which there are one cloud service
provider, i.e., a seller, and multiple interfacing gateways, i.e.,
buyers. At a time slot, each gateway has a number of mobile
users connected with it with the QoS guarantee. Initially, the
service provider sets the ceiling price per unit of bandwidth
and broadcasts the price to all gateways. Each gateway sub-
mits a bid to the service provider including the minimum
required bandwidth which guarantees the QoS, i.e., the service
delay, for its mobile users. The service provider compares its
maximum bandwidth availability and the total demand of the
gateways. If the available bandwidth is greater than or equal to
the total demand, the service provider terminates the auction
and allocates the bandwidth proportionally to the demands of
gateways. Otherwise, the service provider decreases the price
and broadcasts it in the next time slot. The auction continues
until the total demand is greater than or equal to available
bandwidth. Each gateway then pays the service provider the
price of bandwidth based on the prepay mechanism as in [195].
In general, a gateway tries to maximize its utility which is the
difference between the revenue that it receives from serving
mobile users and the price that the gateway pays to the service
provider for the allocated bandwidth. The utility is a concave
function with respect to the gateway’s bid. Using the second-
order derivative of the utility function, it was proved that there
exits a Nash equilibrium at which the gateways’ utilities are
maximized. However, the assumption that each gateway knows
the bid value of others is not realistic.
Cloud service 
provider (seller)
Interface
gateways 
(buyers)
Mobile 
users
RAN
Bid Bid
Price
Fig. 11. Bandwidth allocation based on auction in MCN.
One shortcoming of the approach in [194] is that the service
provider may redistribute bandwidth for all gateways even if
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TABLE VI
A SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MAJOR APPROACHES FOR THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD DATA CENTER
NETWORKING.
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[124] • Support multiple bandwidth units • Have high computational complexity
[129] • Achieve computational efficiency • Evaluate bids based on only a single attribute
[130]
• Support both bandwidth reservation and band-
width allocation
• Support a single bandwidth unit
• Have uncertainty in future demands and resource
utilization
[132] • Achieve win-win solution • Have slow convergence
[59] • Adapt to the high flexible requests of users • Not adapt time-guarantee requests
[66] • Achieve high network utilization • Support only a single cloud provider
[158] • Adapt to the time-varying application’s needs • Have high computational complexity
[172] • Achieve stable profit over time • Have high computational complexity
[175]
• Achieve low computational complexity
• Guarantee workflow deadline • Have unreliability in spot instances
[162] • Be easy to be implemented • Not use market factors
[85] • Achieve win-win solution • Have slow convergence
[186] • Address the workload elasticity of users • Be challenging to determine of users’ behavior
[190]
• Support multiple cloud providers and multiple
cloud tenants
• Have unstable equilibrium
• Have slow convergence
only one gateway is overloaded by many users. The authors in
[196] investigated sharing users among an overloaded gateway
and its neighbors. The English auction is used. Initially, the
overloaded gateway, i.e., the seller, broadcasts the information
of the user’s location to neighbors, i.e., buyers. If the user
is within the region of a neighbor, this gateway sends the
overloaded gateway an average QoS index which is determined
based on its allocated bandwidth and the service delays of
current users. The overloaded gateway also estimates a QoS
index for the user based on the gateway’s average QoS
index and the information received from the service provider
including the minimum delay threshold and the service delay.
The overloaded gateway accepts the interested gateways as
participants in the auction if the difference between its esti-
mated index and the neighbors’ average index is smaller than
a threshold. At the initial state of the auction, the overloaded
gateway broadcasts the minimum price for sharing the user.
In each iteration, the gateway increases the price until its
current utility value exceeds the initial value. The overloaded
gateway allocates the user to the neighbor which accepts the
price. The overloaded gateway then gets the payoff from
the winning neighbor. However, the assumption about the
information provided by the service provider for estimating
the QoS index is not always possible.
B. Resource management in Cloud-RAN
Cloud-Radio Access Network (Cloud-RAN) is a centralized,
cloud computing-based architecture for radio access networks
[197]. In Cloud-RANs, signal processing functions of a base
station is performed in the cloud, i.e., centralized BaseBand
processing Units (BBUs) or BBUs pool, as shown in Fig.
12. Then, the transmissions of radio signals to users are
performed by Remote Radio Heads (RRHs) based on the
baseband signals received from the cloud. To connect BBUs
and RRHs, fronthaul links are used. One of the design goals
in Cloud-RAN is to minimize the total downlink transmission
power from RRHs to users while maintaining the fronthaul
capacity and user QoS constraints.
Fronthaul links/
fiber-optic links
RRH
RRH
RRH
RRH
User
User
User
User
Cloud/BBUs pool
BBU
BBU
BBU
Backhaul 
links
Core 
network
Fig. 12. Cloud-RAN architecture.
To achieve the goal, the authors in [198] studied two
problems. The first problem aims to determine a set of RRHs
serving each mobile user and the precoding vectors for RRHs
to minimize the total transmission power from RRHs to mobile
users with the constraints on fronthaul capacity. The second
problem is to minimize the total transmission power from
RRHs to mobile users and total fronthaul capacity between
BBUs and RRHs. The first problem is addressed by iteratively
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solving the second problem while adjusting pricing coefficients
associated with RRHs. A pricing coefficient for each RRH
refers to the price per unit of fronthaul capacity for the link
between the cloud and RRH. The fronthaul capacity of the
RRH is a decreasing function of its pricing coefficient. Solving
the first problem is implemented via the binary searching
method which adjusts the pricing coefficients so that the
fronthaul capacities of RRHs are equal to their maximum
allowable limits. In the second problem, the objective function
is concave, and the feasible region corresponding to all the
constraints is also convex. Thus, this problem can be solved
by using the gradient method. Simulation results showed that
the total transmission power is smaller when the maximum
number of RRHs serving one user is larger. However, this
also results in the high computational complexity.
The model in [198] consists of a single cloud serving
multiple users via RRHs. Multiple clouds can be used to
satisfy the processing demands of users, called M-CRAN
(MultiCloud RAN) [199]. The authors in [200] addressed the
issue of assigning users, i.e., buyers, to clouds, i.e., sellers,
such that the overall net benefit of each cloud is maximized.
Each cloud solves the knapsack problem [201] the objective
and constraint of which are the net benefit and the resource
budget, respectively. The resource budget is defined as the
maximum number of users that the cloud can serve. The cloud
also pays its users penalty costs if the QoS service cannot be
guaranteed. Therefore, the net benefit function of the cloud
serving a user is the difference between the price that the user
pays and the penalty cost. The optimization problem is NP-
hard. However, a full polynomial time approximation scheme
[202] can be used to find an optimal set of users. The cloud
can increase the penalty cost for attracting more users and
iteratively perform the algorithm to maximize its overall net
benefit. However, the high computational complexity will be
incurred.
Summary: In this section, we have reviewed the existing
literature of pricing-based resource management approaches in
MCN. These approaches with their references are summarized
in Table VII. As seen, auction-based approaches are well
suited for the bandwidth allocation in MCN. However, the
pricing models developed for the resource management in
Cloud-RAN are relatively few. Further research is required
to extend the preliminary results reviewed in this section.
In the following section, we review the existing economic
and pricing models for resource allocation in edge computing
which includes a variety of network technologies, i.e., the
cloudlet, cloudIoT, social cloud, and self-organization cloud.
VI. APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS
FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN EDGE COMPUTING
The cloud data center and mobile cloud networking are
considered to be centralized paradigms, with storage and pro-
cessing resources hosted within large data centers belonging
to cloud providers. However, such paradigms face issues such
as peak usage, high operational costs, bandwidth bottlenecks,
and service interruption due to natural disasters (e.g., fire,
earthquake, and power outage) [53]. Edge computing models
that exploit distributed “edge” devices can solve the issues.
As shown in Fig. 13, edge devices can be small-scale data
centers, volunteered computers, users devices (e.g., laptops,
smartphones, and iPads) and sensors that are at the periphery
of the network. Therefore, edge computing pushes the frontier
of computing applications, data, and services away from the
core of the data center network to the edges [38]. To attract
users to contribute their resources, incentive mechanisms using
pricing and payment strategies have been adopted in order to
guarantee the stable scale of participants and QoS. Thus, this
section reviews economic and pricing models for the resource
management in some common models of edge computing.
Data centers 
Core
Edges: small-
scale data centers
Edges: user 
devices/sensors
Fig. 13. Edge-centric computing model.
A. Cloudlet
Cloudlet, also known as mobile edge computing [203] or
mobile micro-cloud [204], is a mobility-enhanced small-scale
cloud data center. It can be located at the edge of the network,
e.g., at the base station to which the mobile users connect, with
the aim of providing cloud services to mobile users at lower
latency [205]. Thus, the cloudlet is considered to be the middle
tier of a 3-tier model, i.e., the mobile device-cloudlet-cloud as
shown in Fig. 14. Resources at the cloudlet tier are limited
[206]. Therefore, competition-based pricing models such as
auction, non-cooperative game, or supply-demand model are
effectively used for resource allocation to mobile users.
1) Double auction: To motivate resource pooling, cloudlets
can form cloudlet groups as illustrated in Fig. 14. The authors
in [207] adopted the real-time group-buying auction for the
cloudlet group to offer its services, i.e., mobile videos, to
nearby mobile users with lower prices while maximizing the
profit of the group. The group-buying auction is a type of
double auction in which buyers get more discounts from sellers
if more buyers participate [208]. The model consists of the
cloud (i.e., the supplier) connected to the cloudlet group (i.e.,
the retailer) through the Internet and the mobile users (i.e.,
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TABLE VII
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN MOBILE CLOUD NETWORKING
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
R
es
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e
m
an
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em
en
t
[192]
Combinatorial
clock auction
Mobile
cloud
network
owner
Cloud
users Bandwidth
Based on buyers’ bids, the winner determination
problem is solved by the anytime search
algorithm
Efficient allocation Optimalsolution
[194] Dutch auction
Cloud
service
provider
Gateways Bandwidth
Based on buyers’ bids, the seller compares its
bandwidth availability and the total demand of
buyers to either allocate resources or decrease
the price such that the demand and the supply
are equal
Buyers’ utility
maximization
Nash
equilibrium
[196] English auction
Overloaded
gateway
Neighboring
gateways
Sharing
user
Seller initially broadcasts the minimum price for
sharing user to buyers, and then increases the
price until its current utility exceeds the initial
value. The buyer which accepts this price is
selected as the winner for serving the sharing
users
QoS guarantee, and
seller’s utility
maximization
Nash
equilibrium
[198] Generic pricing Cloud/BBU RRHs
Fronhaul
capacity
Seller sets the price per unit of fronthaul
capacity. The binary searching method is used to
adjust the price to solve the problem which
determines a set of RRHs serving each mobile
user and the precoding vectors for RRHs
Buyers’ power
minimization, and
optimal trade-off
between transmission
power and required
fronthaul capacity
Optimal
solution
[199]
Knapsack
problem Clouds Users Service
Each seller solves the knapsack problem to select
an optimal set of buyers which maximize its
overall net benefit. The problem is solved by the
full polynomial time approximation method
Seller’s benefit
maximization, and QoS
guarantee
Pareto
efficiency
TABLE VIII
A SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MAJOR APPROACHES FOR THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN MOBILE CLOUD NETWORKING.
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[192]
• Require little global information
• Achieve economic efficiency • Have high computational complexity
[194] • Have fast convergence • Require a centralized allocation algorithm
[199] • Support multiple cloud providers • Have high computational complexity
Cloud
Data center 
Data center 
Cloudlet
Cloudlet
P2P
Internet Internet
Mobile 
user
Mobile 
user
Mobile 
user
Fig. 14. A 3-tier model with mobile devices, cloudlets, and cloud.
buyers). One of the cloudlets starts the auction with an initial
auction price, a specified supply quantity, and an auction
period. Users with bidding prices higher than the auction
price are selected as successful bidders, i.e., winners. Potential
bidders including unsuccessful bidders and new incoming
users are sorted in a descending order of bidding prices. The
cloudlet then finds the first bidder with the bidding price
not less than the auction price in the price curve. The price
curve is a non-increasing sequence of auction prices obtained
via maximizing the expected profit function of the cloudlet.
Potential bidders, the bidding prices of which are higher than
that of the first bidder, are the winners. When the auction ends,
all winners buy the services at the final deal price, which is
lower when more winners are selected. This strategy stimulates
more users to choose the service from the cloudlet group.
The double auction discussed in [207] can achieve the
individual rationality and budget balance, but it cannot guar-
antee the truthfulness. The authors in [209] addressed this
problem by charging users according to the payment policy
of the Vickrey auction. The model consists of: (i) mobile
users, i.e., buyers, (ii) cloudlets, i.e., sellers, and (iii) a central
controller, i.e., an auctioneer. The cloudlet serves only its
nearby mobile users to reduce communication latency. The
auctioneer sorts buyers in an ascending order of bids and
sellers in a descending order of asks. The ask of the median
seller is selected as a threshold to determine the winning buyer
and seller candidates. For each winning seller candidate, the
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auctioneer selects a winning buyer with the highest price and
charges it a price of the second highest bid. If the buyer wins
two or more sellers, the auctioneer can select only one seller
such that the buyer’s utility is the highest. The simulation
results showed that when a buyer bids a truthful price, its
utility is improved. However, the system efficiency in terms
of the number of final matchings between winning buyers
and winning sellers only achieves around 50% of that of the
optimal strategy.
Using the same model as in [209], the authors in [210]
considered the randomness and the uncertainty in the auction
to improve the system efficiency. Specifically, the auctioneer
sorts sellers randomly as a list. To determine a winning buyer
for each seller, the auctioneer defines the ask vector excluding
the ask of that seller and then calculates the median ask of this
vector. Among buyers with the bids higher than the ask of the
seller, the buyer with the highest bid wins the service of the
seller. Then, the winning buyer and the seller are inserted to
the sets of winning buyers and winning sellers, respectively.
The clearing price charging to the winning buyer and the price
paid to the seller are set to be the same. More specifically, the
price is the maximum of the median ask and the second highest
bid of all buyers for the seller. Since any winning buyer in the
set of the winners does not compete with other buyers for
the remaining sellers, the candidate elimination algorithm as
in [209] is not necessary, and the system efficiency is thus
improved. The simulation results showed that the proposed
solution achieves the system efficiency up to 80% of that of
the optimal strategy. However, the proposed solution cannot
guarantee strong truthfulness for buyers.
2) Non-cooperative game: The authors in [72] considered
a model with multiple brokers which assign cloud resources,
i.e., the computation resource and network bandwidth, re-
served from the cloudlet and the public cloud to mobile
users as shown in Fig. 15. Long-term reservation and on-
demand request are applicable at the public cloud, but the bid
proportion policy should be implemented at the cloudlet due to
its limited resources. The bid proportion policy [211] allocates
resources to buyers proportionally to their purchasing prices.
Each broker, i.e., each buyer, decides its bidding price and on-
demand request such that its average cloud price is minimized,
given other brokers’ strategies. The average price is a convex
function of the bidding price, and the brokers are selfish to
minimize the brokers’ average prices. Therefore, the non-
cooperative game is used to determine their optimal decisions.
The Jacobi best-response algorithm [212] is then adopted to
iteratively achieve an approximation of the Nash equilibrium
at which bidding prices of all brokers are optimal. Simulation
results showed that the proposed solution can reduce the
price around 23% compared with the case that mobile users
submit their requests to the public cloud directly. However,
information sharing schemes among brokers to enforce the
truthfulness need to be developed.
3) Supply and demand model: The above models are for
static environments in which users are not on the move. When
they are moving, pricing strategies relying on central entities,
e.g., the auction, are not appropriate. In such a system, the
authors in [213] addressed the issue of exchanging cloudlet
Cloudlet
Mobile 
user
Mobile 
user
Mobile 
user
Public cloud
Data center 
Data center 
BrokerBroker
On-demand
 requests
On-demand
 requests
Bid Bid
Internet
Fig. 15. Resource allocation in presence of brokers.
resources including CPU cycles, storage, and broadband net-
work, among mobile users through the supply and demand
model. Each user owns a cloudlet and acts as a buyer and
a seller during its mobility. Given the budget, the objective
of each user is to maximize the individual payoff which is
the difference between the utility of buying resources and the
cost of selling resources. This is a convex problem and can be
solved by the primal-dual algorithm [214]. The solution allows
the user to decide an optimal amount of resources to sell.
To clear the resource market while maximizing each user’s
utility, an aggregate excess demand function is introduced.
This function is the difference between the total demand
and the total supply over all users in network. The classical
tatonnement process [215] is used for the price adjustment to
achieve the market equilibrium where the total demand equals
the total supply. In particular, if the total demand exceeds the
total supply, the seller increases the unit resource. Otherwise,
the unit price should be reduced. The process continues until
the function equals zero. However, the equilibrium may not
be stable, and the computational cost for converging to the
equilibrium can be high.
Apart from the aforementioned cloudlet models, a similar
model, called Mobile Telecom Cloud (MTC), is found in
[216]. Edge cloud services are given by mobile network
operators which provide the last-mile Internet access to mo-
bile users as shown Fig. 16. The network operators act as
brokerages which use discount from cloud providers, e.g.,
Amazon, to offer better and cheaper cloud services to their
users. Specifically, when receiving users’ cloud requests, the
brokerage formulates the resource reservation as the total cost
minimization problem. The total cost depends on the users’
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cloud requests, costs of cloud services offered by the brokerage
or cloud providers, and the discount threshold from the cloud
providers. This problem is then solved by either the linear
programming combined with the rounding technique [217] or
the min-cost greedy. The optimal solution allows the brokerage
to set its price range using two conditions: (i) its offer price
is less than the proposed price of the cloud provider, and (ii)
the total cost of the brokerage is less than the sum of charged
prices to users. These conditions aim to guarantee a high profit
for the brokerage while attracting more users. The simulation
results indicated that the cost of brokerage with the min-cost
greedy algorithm is smaller than that obtained from with the
linear programming. Moreover, the min-cost greedy algorithm
runs much faster than the linear programming with rounding
which requires multiple iterations to converge.
Mobile 
telecom cloud
Mobile 
user
Mobile 
user
Mobile 
user
Distributed 
switching center 
and data center
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Data center Data center 
Fig. 16. Mobile telecom cloud model.
B. Volunteer Computing Systems
This section reviews economic approaches for resource
allocation in volunteer computing systems. Similar to the
cloudlet model, volunteer computing systems allow com-
puter owners to contribute their computing resources for
processing users’ tasks. However, instead of using small-scale
data centers as in the cloudlet model, a large number of
distributed volunteered computers are used. They are con-
nected with each other over WANs as illustrated in Fig. 17.
Some projects are recently designed based on the framework,
e.g., BOINC [218] with 65,000 computers, and Cloud@Home
(http://clouds.gforge.inria.fr/pmwiki.php). In such a network,
any volunteered computer, also called a host or a node, can
act as a task scheduler and a resource contributor to schedule
and execute users’ tasks.
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- Task 1
- Task 2
- Task 3
 .
Bid
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computer
User
User
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Bid
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Fig. 17. Task scheduling in volunteer computing system.
1) Reverse Vickrey auction: Like the cloudlet model, due
to the limited resource at the volunteered computers, the
reverse Vickrey auction is usually applied for allocating users’
tasks to the volunteered computers in volunteer computing
systems. Such an approach was proposed in [219]. More
specifically, when receiving a task request from a user, the
task scheduler sends a query message including the expected
qualified resource demand of the task, e.g., the CPU, memory,
and network bandwidth, to its neighbors using the distributed
range query protocol [220]. This searching continues until
the number of hops is greater than a time-to-live threshold.
Resource nodes (sellers) reply the task scheduler (buyer)
the response messages (asks) containing the resource nodes’
identifiers (e.g., IP address), resource availability states, and
the corresponding prices. The resource node with the lowest
price is selected for executing the user’s task, and the payment
for this node is implemented according to the Vickrey auction
policy. Compared with the random-node-selection approach,
the simulation results indicated that the proposed approach
improves the resource node’s payoff up to five times. However,
the finished task ratio of the proposed approach is slightly
lower than that of the random selection approach. A multi-
attribute reverse auction can be used to improve the perfor-
mance.
2) Profit maximization: Since the task scheduler acts as a
broker to map task requirements to the resources of nodes,
the profit of the broker needs to be considered. The authors
in [221] employed the profit maximization-based pricing to
determine the costs paid for the volunteered computer owners
and the resource prices offered to the users to maximize
the broker’s profit. Each user submits to the scheduler a
task execution request including the required resources (i.e.,
the computation and network resources), the number of time
slots, the deadline, and a desired success probability of the
reservation in the case of resource failures. The scheduler
determines the probability distributions of price acceptance for
users and the probability distributions of cost acceptance by
the owners. These distributions can be learned in an online
fashion. Based on these distributions, the broker defines its
profit by computing the total revenue minus the total cost.
The optimization problem is then solved by a sequential opti-
mization algorithm in which each price and cost for a request
type is optimized sequentially. Simulation results showed that
the total profit of the broker at the low demand is significantly
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higher than that at the high demand. The reason is that even
at high demand, the broker cannot increase the price offered
to users to ensure that they still accept the prices.
3) Demand-based pricing: The approaches in [219], [221]
may not satisfy some users which are willing to pay pro-
portionally to the QoS. Hence, the authors in [222] adopted
the demand-based pricing for allocating users’ tasks to re-
source nodes. The demand-based pricing charges users ac-
cording to their demand. This pricing strategy is practically
adopted by some cloud service providers, e.g., CloudTweaks
(http://cloudtweaks.com/), to maximize the resource utilization
and guarantee low costs. Specifically, given users’ resource
requirements and nodes’ budgets for executing tasks, the node
sets the resource price based on the total resource demand
of tasks across the network. If the total demand is less than
50% of the total capacity of the node, the price is charged
according to the base price. Otherwise, the higher price is
applied. Also, the node uses the k-means clustering algorithm
to classify the tasks into high, medium, and low priority levels.
The node checks the resource requirement of the task with the
highest priority. If the node has available resource to serve the
task and the price for executing the task is within the budget
constraint, the task is given with the preference for execution in
the node. Compared with the first-come first-served approach,
the proposed approach improved significantly the throughput
ratio while reducing the average payment of users. However,
this may lead to revenue loss of resource owners.
4) VCG auction: In practice, users require not only re-
sources within an internal system, but also external resources,
e.g, data center resources. They need to access the external
resources via a gateway of a bandwidth provider [223]. The
authors in [224] considered allocating bandwidth to users so
as to maximize the provider’s revenue. Additionally, it must
ensure the social welfare maximization for the users even if
they can lie about their priority to get higher utility. The VCG
auction is used to achieve this goal. Users, i.e., buyers, submit
to a provider, i.e., a seller, their bids, each of which specifies
the priority class, the bandwidth demand, the valuation, and the
price. Given these information, the provider defines each user’s
utility. The provider finds an optimal schedule to maximize
the sum of utilities of all users through the use of the greedy
approach. Each user is then charged according to the VCG
payment policy. The simulation results highlighted that when
varying the probability of user lying, the social welfare of the
VCG auction is always significantly higher than that of the
first-price and the Vickrey auctions.
C. Client-Assisted Cloud Systems
Client-assisted cloud models are distributed cloud
paradigms which form resource pooling by exploiting
resources of clients [38]. Here, a client or user is referred
to as an “edge” device belonging to the external network
environment of the edge-centric computing as shown in
Fig. 13. Such paradigms aim to reduce the network traffic
and resource burden at servers in volunteer computing
systems, cloudlets, and data centers [225]. In particular, in
what follows, we review economic approaches which have
been used to incentivize users/clients to contribute their local
resources in the different distributed cloud models.
1) Client-assisted cloud storage system: The authors in
[226] addressed the issue of constructing a storage pool for
storage service providers, e.g., Amazon S3, using under-
untilized storage and network bandwidth resources of cloud
users as illustrated in Fig. 18. Due to asynchronous arrivals
of users and service provider [227], the online reverse auction
can be applied. Note that the auction is commonly used for the
online e-commerce, e.g., eBay (http://www.ebay.com/rpp/live-
auctions). Accordingly, users, i.e., sellers, submit their asks
to the service provider, i.e., the buyer. Each ask contains
information about the amount of resources that the user can
contribute, the time window when it is available, and money
remuneration. Upon receiving the asks, the service provider
determines a completeness ratio, which is the ratio of the
total resource from users and its resource demand. If the ratio
is less than one, the service provider uses the storage and
bandwidth from servers in data centers. The resource pooling
cost is thus the sum of the payments to the users plus the
marginal resource cost from the servers. The optimization
problem for the service provider determines the allocation rule
and payment to minimize the resource pooling cost, given
the constraints ensuring the individual rationality of users
and the truthfulness of the mechanism. To achieve the goals,
the allocation rule and payment are designed according to a
marginal pricing function, which is a non-increasing function
of the completeness ratio. It was then proved that the allocation
rule is monotone, and the online auction scheme is truthful.
Simulation results indicated that the social cost in the online
auction is always less than that of the offline VCG auction
when varying the resource pooling demand, the number of
asks, and the ratio between the server cost and the average
asking price.
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cost
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Cloud 
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Cloud 
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Fig. 18. Client-assisted cloud storage allocation using online reverse auction.
The client-assisted cloud model as in [226] still requires the
communication among service providers and users. Therefore,
when another user needs to use the resource, it makes a request
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to the service provider which results in latency. Moreover,
to guarantee the availability of resources, the interaction be-
tween demand users and supply users needs to be considered.
Distributed cloud models such as self-organization cloud and
social cloud can be adopted as discussed below.
2) Self-organization cloud: Self-organization cloud allows
a number of host machines of users to be connected by a P2P
overlay network on the Internet [228]. Since each user may
act as a resource provider or a resource requester, resource
exchange between them is typically modeled by the double
auction. Such an approach was presented in [229] where
the double auction is adopted for the task allocation among
users. The model consists of request users, i.e., buyers, which
require resources, i.e., computational resources and network
bandwidth, for executing their tasks from provision users.
Provision users act as sellers to contribute their resources
for the task execution from the request. Before submitting
bids, buyers have the rough estimation about the price of
the required resources by using a price-setting mechanism,
e.g., SpotCloud (http://www.spotcloud.com). The buyers then
submit to a cloud planner, i.e., an auctioneer, their own bids
including task descriptions, resource specifications, and the
prices that they estimate. The cloud planner selects the buyer
with the highest price as the winner. Then, the cloud planner
sends the request of the winner to all sellers in the network.
Interested sellers return the cloud planner by their asks. The
seller with the lowest price is selected to provide resources to
the buying winner. The lowest price is also the payment of the
buying winner. However, how to discover users with available
resource in the network was not given.
User/
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User
User
User User
User
User
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requests
Fig. 19. A general system of self-organization cloud.
The authors in [230], [231] proposed to use the kademlia
protocol [232] which allows a buyer to perform a resource dis-
covery process to find candidate sellers with available resource
in the network before the reverse auction is executed. Indeed,
the candidate sellers can submit to the buyer their asks, each
of which includes the information about available resources
(i.e., CPU, memory, and bandwidth), QoS (i.e., a latency), a
participation factor, and an incentive value. The participation
factor is defined based on the historical resource contribution
of a seller. The buyer calculates its utility value corresponding
to each ask, taking into account weights assigned to each
component in the ask. The buyer selects a seller whose ask
enables it to achieve the highest utility as the winner. The
winner receives the incentive value representing the resources
that it will receive in future. Such a non-money reward (along
with coupons [233] or reputation score [234]) reduces the
incentive costs for the buyer. This cost is significantly low as
the number of sellers increases as shown in the simulation
results. The resource allocation is thus fair and achieves
the system stability. However, the reverse auction cannot be
applied when the resource is insufficient.
3) Social Cloud: A social cloud is “a resource and service
sharing framework utilizing relationships established between
members of a social network” [235]. This model is thus similar
to the self-organization cloud. However, if users in the self-
organization cloud are anonymous and are not accountable for
their actions, then accountability can be established through
existing friend relationships in the social cloud.
The social marketplace is at the core of the social cloud
which is similar to online procurement markets. Provision
users in the social network arrive in a sequential manner
to offer their services. Thus the posted-price mechanism is
usually used. The authors in [5] adopted the posted-price
model for storage service marketplaces in the social cloud as
shown in Fig. 20. To enable the accountability, information
of users such as user ID and credit balance, is managed by a
bank. When each request user, i.e., a buyer, requests posted
price offers for specific services, the cloud application checks
the available balance of the buyer. The cloud application gives
a list of provision users, i.e., sellers, their resource availability
and the pricing information. These information is periodically
updated and stored in a monitoring and discovery system.
When the request user selects a service from a provision user,
the cloud application creates SLA. If both parties accept the
agreement, it is then passed to the bank for transferring credits
between them. However, the provision users can lie about
service costs to gain higher payoffs.
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Provisioning 
users
Service interaction
Fig. 20. Social cloud market infrastructure.
Therefore, the reverse Vickrey auction can be used as pro-
posed in [235]. Upon receiving the storage service description
of the request, an auction manager, i.e., an auctioneer, solicits
asks from provision users within the social network. The
asking prices are determined based on pre-defined metrics,
and a seller with the lowest asking price is selected as the
winner. Similar to [5], SLA between the buyer and the winner
is created, and the credit transfer is done through a bank.
29
The credit is determined according to the payment policy
of the reverse Vickrey auction which prevents misreports of
provision users. The auction-based model is generally more
complex than the posted-price model due to soliciting asks
from sellers. To be appropriate in the social cloud environment
with a large number of bidders, the auction manager needs
to execute a number of concurrent auctions. As shown in
the simulation results, a small scale auction manager may
complete 65 concurrent auctions each with 50 bidders per
minute.
To adapt to more requirements of users, the multi-attribute
reverse Vickrey auction can be used. Multi-attribute auctions
allow buyers and sellers to negotiate multiple attributes in
addition to the price such as service quality and service
deadline. The authors in [236] adopted such an auction for
the task allocation among users in the social network. The
request user initially sends its task description including a
set of task attributes and the corresponding weights to a
nearby auctioneer. The auctioneer broadcasts the request in
the publishing area which may be described by the friends’
community reachable through, e.g., a web-portal. Upon re-
ceiving the task request, potential provision users which meet
the minimum attribute requirements submit their asks to the
auctioneer. The auctioneer evaluates the utility score of each
ask based on the available attributes of the ask and the request
user’s weights. The provision user with the highest utility score
will be selected as the winner. The auctioneer then creates
SLA involving the service price, the availability of resources,
and the agreed attribute values between the winner and the
buyer. The winner will get the price, which is increased by
the amount, such that the utility of the transaction equals the
utility score of the second-highest ask. However, how to define
the request user’s weights is not specified.
4) Cloud-Centric Internet of Things: This subsection con-
siders an edge computing model in which the edge devices
are sensing devices, e.g., smartphones of users, as shown in
Fig. 13. Since these devices are equipped with various types
of sensors, they are capable of generating sensing data. A
large number of smartphones allow to gather sensing data from
interest areas, and such a paradigm is called a crowdsensing
network [237]. To provide the data to interested individu-
als/organizations, the crowdsensing networks and the cloud
platforms are integrated. Since the crowdsensing network is
also a main component of IoT [238], the integration can be
called Cloud-centric Internet of Things (Cloud-IoT) [239] or
Cloud of Things [240]. The main challenge in such models
is to provide incentive mechanisms to users such that they
perform sensing tasks and provide sensing data with the lowest
cost. Typically, the reverse auction mechanisms are used.
The authors in [239] employed the reverse auction scheme
to assign required tasks to phone users. The model has three
entities: (i) cloud users which act as buyers, (ii) phone users,
i.e., sellers, and (iii) a sensing server, i.e., an auctioneer.
Once receiving a set of sensing tasks from the cloud users,
the sensing server broadcasts the task requests to all phone
users in a specific area. Interested phone users reply with
asks, and the server sorts these users based on their marginal
value contributions. The marginal value contribution of a user
is defined as an additional value introduced to the set by
including the sensing task of the user [241]. Users with the
highest marginal value contributions are selected for the tasks.
The payments for the selected users are not less than their
asking prices and determined based on their marginal value
contributions to the set of sensing tasks.
In practice, mobility of phone users can degrade the utility
of the platform since the users can move out a service region.
The lightweight triangulation method [242] can be adopted
for the server to keep track of the mobility pattern of each
phone user. The utility of the platform also decreases due to
the malicious phone users aiming at sending altered sensing
data to the cloud users. Reputation of users is introduced to
overcome this issue as proposed in [243] and [244]. The model
and the reverse auction mechanism used in these approaches
are similar to those in [239]. However, upon receiving sensing
data from each phone user, the server runs an outlier detection
(anomaly detection) algorithm [245] to classify the sensing
data as an outlier or a non-outlier. Since the trustworthiness of
a user can be time-varying, the user’s instantaneous reputation
is stored and updated in the database of the cloud platform.
The current reputation of a user is determined as the function
of the number of its non-outliers and outliers. When selecting
winners, the server uses the ratio of its bidding price and
current reputation to evaluate the bid. This selection process
is to increase the selection probability of a phone user with
a lower price and higher reputation, i.e., a smaller ratio. The
payments for the winners are then applied similar to those in
[239]. The simulation results showed that with the proposed
approach, the payments of malicious phone users can be
reduced around 55% compared with those in [239].
Summary: In this section, we have discussed four major
models of the edge computing, and for each model we have
reviewed the related economic and pricing approaches. We
summarize the approaches along with references in Table IX
and Table X. From the two tables, we observe that more client-
assisted cloud systems have been recently studied. This is
reasonable because the distributed cloud models reduce costs
and service latency for users. In the next section, we review
economic and pricing approaches for the resource management
in cloud-based Video on Demand (VoD) systems. Cloud-based
VoD systems are new video content delivery models in the
development of cloud networking.
VII. APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS
FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD-BASED VOD
SYSTEMS
This section describes and reviews the related work of
cloud-based Video on Demand (cloud-based VoD), which is
one important service supported by the cloud networking
[246]. VoD, e.g., Internet Protocol TeleVision (IPTV) [247],
is a system that enables users/clients to select and watch
video contents whenever they want instead of watching at a
specific broadcast time [248]. Traditional VoD services are
based on the client-server or P2P architectures which have a
major drawback of high costs and low bandwidth utilization,
especially with the large and imbalanced demands of users.
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TABLE IX
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN EDGE COMPUTING
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
C
lo
ud
le
t
[207]
Real-time
group-buying
auction
Cloudlet Mobileusers
Mobile
videos
Seller forms a price curve of auction prices, and
buyers with bidding prices higher than the
auction price are the winners. The final deal
price is the final auction price
Payment minimization,
and expected profit
maximization
Subgame
perfect
equilibrium
[209] Double auction Cloudlets
Mobile
users
Processing,
storage,
and
networking
Based on sellers’ asks, the auctioneer determines
buyer and seller winning candidates. The buyer
candidate with the highest price is the winner and
is charged with a price of the second highest bid
Individual rationality,
budget balance, and
truthfulness
Market
equilibrium
[210] Double auction Cloudlets
Mobile
users
Processing,
storage,
and
networking
Winning buyer for each seller is determined
based on sellers’ asks. The clearing price
charged to the winning buyer and the price paid
to the winning seller are set at the same price
Individual rationality,
budget balance,
truthfulness, and
system efficiency
Market
equilibrium
[72]
Non-
cooperative
game
Cloudlet Brokers Cloudresources
The Jacobi best-response algorithm is used to
optimize the bidding prices of buyers
Cost minimization for
mobile users
Nash
equilibrium
[213]
Supply and
demand model Mobile user
Mobile
users
Cloudlet
servers
Seller uses an aggregate excess demand function
to define the total demand and total supply. The
classical tatonnement process is used to adjust
the price depending on the resource demand to
clear the market resource
Payoff maximization,
and resource efficiency
Market
equilibrium
[216]
Cost
minimization
MTC
brokerage
Mobile
users
Cloud
services
Given buyers’ requests, the seller formulates the
resource reservation as the total cost
minimization. The linear programming and the
min-cost greedy are used to solve the problem
Seller’ profit
maximization, and
buyers’ payment
minimization
Optimal
solution
Vo
lu
nt
ee
r
co
m
pu
tin
g
sy
st
em
[219]
Reverse
Vickrey auction
Volunteered
computers
Task
scheduler
CPU,
memory,
and
network
bandwidth
Buyer searches sellers with available resources
via the distributed range query protocol. The
buyer selects the seller with the lowest price as
the winner, and the payment is based on the
Vickrey auction policy
Payoff improvement,
and truthfulness
Nash
equilibrium
[221]
Profit
maximization
Volunteered
computer
owner
Users
CPU,
memory,
and
network
bandwidth
A broker determines the costs paid for the seller
and the prices offered to the buyers to maximize
the broker’s profit. A sequential optimization is
then introduced to solve this problem
Profit maximization Optimalsolution
[222]
Demand-based
pricing
Volunteered
computer Users
Task
execution
service
Seller assigns priority levels to tasks based on the
k-means clustering algorithm and then executes
tasks with the highest priority levels. The price is
set based on the total resource demand of buyers
Throughput ration
improvement, and
payment reduction
Value opti-
mization
[224] VCG auction
Bandwidth
provider Users Bandwidth
Given buyers’ requests, the seller finds an
optimal schedule to maximize the sum of utilities
of all buyers by using the greedy approach. The
price is then set according to the VCG payment
policy
Social welfare
maximization
Nash
equilibrium
Therefore, to reduce the costs and improve resource utilization,
VoD providers, i.e., cloud tenants, can use cloud platforms
from cloud providers to form the cloud-based VoD systems.
The cloud-based VoD system can also provide flexibility to
support users with various requirements [249]. However, the
bandwidth cost is still significant in cloud-based VoD systems
since video contents typically consume a large amount of
bandwidth. The ultimate goal of VoD providers is to minimize
the bandwidth cost and maximize their profit while satisfying
users’ demand, and thus pricing strategies are applied. In
particular, the economic and pricing models have been used
to address the following issues.
• Bandwidth allocation: In cloud-based VoD systems,
VoD providers store their video contents in the cloud
servers belonging to cloud providers. Therefore, the VoD
providers need to reserve bandwidth which allows them
to upload the video contents to the cloud servers as well
as to guarantee the access for their users. Economic and
pricing models have been used as solutions in which
the bandwidth reservation cost is minimized while still
satisfying users’ demand.
• P2P caching: To reduce the reservation cost from the
cloud servers, the VoD providers may use local resources,
e.g., the storage and upload bandwidth, of peers or users
to cache video data. Since the users or peers are naturally
selfish, pricing strategies have been adopted to incentivize
the users to contribute their resources while minimizing
the cost.
A. Cloud-Based VoD Models
This section presents economic and pricing approaches for
bandwidth allocation in Cloud-based VoD systems. A major
issue in such models is to allocate the bandwidth owned by
cloud providers to VoD providers for delivering video contents.
Depending on the specific scenario, a pricing model is applied
to address the issue. In particular, if the model consists of
a VoD provider and multiple cloud providers or multiple
VoD providers and a cloud provider, competition-based pricing
schemes such as auctions and non-cooperative game will be
used. On the contrary, if the objective of the resource allocation
is to maximize social welfare of all VoD providers, the network
utility maximization can be adopted.
1) Combinatorial auction: The authors in [250] considered
the cloud-based VoD system with a VoD provider and several
cloud providers as shown in Fig. 21. The VoD provider
delivers/allocates groups of videos from its local servers to
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TABLE X
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN EDGE COMPUTING (CONT.)
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
C
lie
nt
-a
ss
is
te
d
cl
ou
d
sy
st
em
s
[226]
Online reverse
auction
Cloud
storage
users
Storage
service
provider
Storage
service
Based on sellers’ asks, buyer uses a marginal
pricing function to determine the allocation rule
and the payment to minimize the resource
pooling cost
Social cost
minimization,
truthfulness, and
individual rationality
Nash
equilibrium
[229] Double auction
Provision
users
Request
users Resources
Given buyers’ bids, a planner selects a buyer
with the highest price and then finds a seller with
the lowest price to provide resources to the buyer
Resource efficiency Marketequilibrium
[230]
[231]
Reverse auction Provisionusers
Request
user Resources
Based on sellers’ asks, the buyer calculates the
corresponding utility values. The seller whose
ask maximizes the buyer’ utility is selected as the
winner. The winner then gets an incentive value
System stability, and
low incentive cost
Nash
equilibrium
[5] Posted-price Provisionusers
Request
user
Storage
service
Based on a list of sellers along with their posted
price offers, the buyer selects a seller and the
cloud application creates an SLA. The buyer
then pays the seller through the bank
Utility maximization
for buyer
Nash
equilibrium
[235]
Reverse
Vickrey auction
Provision
users
Request
user
Storage
service
Given sellers’ asks, the auction manager selects a
seller with the lowest price as the winner. The
payment follows the payment policy of the
reverse Vicrkey auction
Truthfulness, and
payment minimization
Nash
equilibrium
[236]
Multi-attribute
reverse Vickrey
auction
Provision
users
Request
user
Task
execution
service
The auctioneer evaluates the utility scores
corresponding to sellers’ asks. The seller with
the highest utility score is selected as the winner.
The payment is determined based on the
payment policy of the reverse Vicrkey auction
Utility maximization of
buyer, truthfulness
Nash
equilibrium
[239] Reverse auction Phone users
Cloud
users
Sensing
task
The server selects the sellers with the highest
marginal contributions as the winners. Payments
for the winners are determined based on their
marginal contributions
Incentive cost
minimization
Nash
equilibrium
[243]
[244]
Reverse auction Phone users Cloudusers
Sensing
task
Same as [239], but for each seller, the server
defines a ratio of its asking price and reputation.
The reputation is determined using the outlier
detection algorithm. Sellers with smaller ratios
are selected as the winners
Utility maximization,
and incentive cost
reduction
Nash
equilibrium
the cloud providers. Since there are several combinations of
videos for trading, the combinatorial auctions are adopted.
The VoD provider as a buyer classifies videos into groups,
and each group consists of the same user demands. The VoD
provider also evaluates price for each group, which is generally
a decreasing function of user demands. Then, the VoD provider
sends the requests to the cloud providers. Depending on
available bandwidth and memory, each cloud provider, i.e.,
a seller, determines the number of groups and the number of
videos in each group that it can serve. Cloud providers respond
to the VoD provider with their asks including the information
related to the number of groups and videos along with the
corresponding prices. The VoD provider computes a distance
value associated with each ask. The distance value is the price
evaluated by the VoD provider minus the price offered by the
cloud provider. The VoD provider selects a cloud provider
with the largest distance value as the winner to allocate its
video groups. To guarantee the truthfulness of the auction,
the payment policy from the Vickrey auction is adopted. The
Approximate Efficiency Maximization (AEM) algorithm [251]
is used to avoid the collusion among cloud providers. The
simulation results showed that the proposed approach saves up
to 10% of the cost compared to the video migration strategy in
[252]. However, multiple VoD providers need to be considered
in the future work.
2) Generic pricing mechanism: The authors in [253] ex-
tended the market model in [250] involving multiple public
cloud providers, i.e., sellers, VoD providers (cloud tenants),
i.e., buyers, and a broker. In this setting, the broker reserves
the actual bandwidth from the cloud providers and sells
VoD provider 
(buyer)
Users/
Viewers
Cloud provider 
(seller)
Cloud provider 
(seller) Cloud provider 
(seller)
Video 
demandsVideo 
demands
Video 
demands
Ask Ask Ask
Fig. 21. Bandwidth allocation in cloud-VoD system based on combinatorial
auction.
probabilistic bandwidth guarantee services to tenants. The
broker determines the lower and upper bounds of the price
to maximize its profit and minimize the bandwidth reservation
cost. The broker then determines a load direction matrix which
directs tenants’ bandwidth demands to the cloud providers. To
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TABLE XI
A SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MAJOR APPROACHES FOR THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN EDGE COMPUTING.
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[207] • Achieve good economic properties
• Have slow convergence
• Have unstable equilibrium
[210]
• Reduce communication latency
• Improve the system efficiency
• Have slow convergence
• Have unstable equilibrium
[72]
• Support both long-term reservation and on-
demand request
• Require buyers to submit their requests simulta-
neously
• Have unstable equilibrium
[221] • Guarantee reliability to buyers
• Be challenging to learn probabilities of price
acceptance for buyers
• Have high computational complexity
[226]
• Support asynchronous arrivals of both buyers
and sellers • Require high communication
[5]
• Support anonymous buyers
• Achieve high reliability and resource availability
• Require frequently monitoring and discovering
the resource availability and prices of sellers
[239] • Support the mobility of sellers
• Require frequently calculating and updating in-
stantaneous reputation of sellers
find the lower bound of the price, the broker defines its profit
which is the sum of prices offered to tenants minus the total
cost for reserving bandwidth from the cloud providers. The
price offered to the tenant is a concave function of its demand,
and the demand is assumed to follow the Gaussian distribution
[254]. The lower bound of the price is determined by using
the gradient ascent algorithm for the profit maximization. For
the upper bound of the price, the broker needs to set the price
lower than that offered by the cloud providers to attract more
tenants. Therefore, the upper bound of the price is actually the
cloud providers’ pricing scheme [255]. The simulation results
showed that the broker can save the bandwidth reservation
cost by more than 30% on average compared with the case
that each tenant reserves bandwidth individually.
3) Non-cooperative game: For the market model in [253],
the pricing scheme of the broker is affected by the cloud
providers, and such a market is considered to be a controlled
market. The authors in [256] considered a free market which
only consists of tenants, i.e., VoD providers and a broker. The
tenants competes with each other for the cloud bandwidth by
submitting their pricing strategy to the broker. The interactions
among selfish tenants are modeled as a non-cooperative game
in which the strategy of each tenant is to set the price so as to
maximize its own utility. The utility is inversely proportional
to the price that the tenant pays. Using the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality and the proof by contradiction, it was shown ana-
lytically that if the broker decides the load direction matrix to
maximize its profit as mentioned in [253], the tenants’ prices
will converge to a unique Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium
still holds even if multiple brokers exist in the market since
the game is played by the tenants. However, the competition
among brokers may lead to a zero profit of brokers.
4) Utility maximization: Unlike the above market models,
the authors in [257] and [258] considered multiple VoD
providers (cloud tenants), which reserve the egress network
bandwidth, i.e., the upload speed, from a data center of a cloud
provider to guarantee delivering smoothly videos to their users.
The objective is to find the resource allocation that maximizes
the tenants’ social welfare. The social welfare is the sum of
tenants’ utilities minus the total cost at the cloud provider, and
thus the utility maximization problem as presented in Section
III-C can be applied. In particular, the tenant utility is a strictly
concave and monotonically increasing function of the allocated
resource while the total cost is a strictly convex function that
is also monotonically increasing with the allocated resource.
Such concavity of the utility function is to guarantee that the
optimization problem has a unique optimal solution. Since
the utility function may not be known by the cloud provider,
and the total cost function may not be known to the tenants,
the centralized algorithms, e.g., the Newton’s method [120],
cannot be applied. The authors in [257] and [258] adopted two
distributed iterative algorithms based on price updates.
In [257], at each iteration, the cloud provider updates the
price charged to each tenant in the next iteration using the
first-order partial derivative of the total cost with respect to
the tenant’s resource allocation and the price at the current
iteration. Given the price at the current iteration, each tenant
determines its resource allocation so as to maximize its utility
minus the cost of using resources. Unlike [257], the price in
[258] is updated by the tenants while the resource allocation is
updated by the cloud provider. At each iteration, each tenant
sets the price in the next iteration based on the first-order
derivative of its utility function and the price at the current
iteration. In both [257] and [258], it was proved that if the
price and the resource allocation reach fixed points, then
the resource allocation will be the optimal solution of the
optimization problem.
In general, compared with the algorithms such as the New-
ton’s method and the Alternating Direction Method of Multi-
plier (ADMM) [259], the proposed approaches minimize the
message passing overhead. This is because the approaches use
only their local information, i.e., the cost and utility functions,
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and feedback update variables. Moreover, the approaches
remove the assumption on the cooperativeness of entities in the
market. For example, in [257] once the cloud provider sets a
price vector, the tenants will find their own resource allocation
to maximize their utilities, which are natural strategies of
selfish tenants. This property is in contrast to the ADMM
[259] which requires more complicated variable updates. The
simulation results showed that the average number of iterations
needed to converge of the proposed approach in [257] is 10
while those of the primal gradient descent algorithm and the
gradient descent-based consistency pricing method [260] are
100 and 50, respectively. However, a more general market with
multiple cloud providers needs to be investigated in the future
work.
B. P2P-Assisted Cloud-Based VoD Models
As stated earlier, an important challenge in cloud-based
VoD systems is the bandwidth cost on the servers in the cloud.
For example, YouTube is estimated to spend $470 million a
year while Facebook spends $500,000 a month on bandwidth
(http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2009/).
To improve scalability and save bandwidth costs at the cloud,
the cloud-based VoD systems can be combined with P2P
networks as shown in Fig. 22. Peers, i.e., users, can download
video contents from both the cloud and other peers in the
P2P network. However, this requires the VoD provider to
provide the peers with an incentive for (i) downloading videos
from other peers rather than the cloud and (ii) caching the
video contents by using their resources, e.g., the memory and
upload bandwidth. Pricing models were introduced to achieve
these goals as discussed in what follows.
Upload 
videos
Download 
videos
Cloud provider
Data center 
Data center 
VoD provider 
P2P 
overlay
User User
User
Download 
videos
Fig. 22. Overview of a P2P-assisted cloud-based VoD model.
1) Stackelberg game: Typically, to reduce the access of
users to servers in the cloud, the VoD provider can apply
smart pricing strategies, e.g., the usage-based pricing, to the
bandwidth consumption. To optimize both utilities of the VoD
provider and users, the Stackelberg game can be adopted as
proposed in [78]. First, the VoD provider which acts as the
leader estimates the cloud bandwidth usage of users by using
the exponentially weighted moving average method [261].
Then, it sets the VoD service price proportionally to the
estimated cloud bandwidth usage. Given the price, users, i.e.,
followers, select bit rates to maximize their utility. The utility
is the difference between the satisfaction degree and the price
that the user pays to the VoD provider. The satisfaction degree
is a concave function of the bit rate. Upon receiving users’
responses, the VoD provider sets the price so as to maximize
its revenue. Based on the new price, each user recalculates
the optimal bit rate that maximizes its utility. The simulation
results showed that the cloud bandwidth consumption of the
proposed approach is significantly lower than that of the
server-side bit rate adaptation approach in [262]. The reason
is that the proposed approach encourages users to download
video chunks from peers through the usage-based pricing.
However, how the users determine their optimal bit rates was
not specified.
2) Double auction: Another solution which reduces cloud
bandwidth consumption is to share the surplus upload band-
width among peers, called the prefetching strategy [263]. As
mentioned in Section VI-C2, the resource sharing among peers
is typically implemented in a decentralized manner since any
peer may be a buyer or a seller. Thus, the resource sharing can
be modeled as the double auction-based market as proposed
in [264]. The market is divided into several sub-markets, each
of which only trades one video segment. When a peer acts as
a buyer, it broadcasts a bid to its neighbors. A seller compares
its ask with the bid. If the ask is less than the bid, the seller
will propose the buyer to trade the segment at a transaction
price, which is the average of the ask and the bid. Since the
transaction price is less than the bid and larger than the ask,
the proposed approach is the ex-post individual rationality,
i.e., the expected utility of participants is non-negative. This
incentivizes peers to exchange video segments with each other
rather than to download from the server. The simulation results
showed that the proposed approach outperforms the near-
sequential prefetching strategy [265] and the popularity-based
prefetching strategy [266] in terms of server bandwidth costs.
However, since the buyer only receives a video segment in a
sub-market, it may need to participate in other sub-markets to
satisfy its demand. This increases the latency of delivering the
video.
3) Generic pricing mechanisms for the P2P caching: In
practice, peers may not be satisfied due to the lack of some
video contents in the market. One possible reason is that
the other peers may clear their local storage after finishing
watching the videos. The authors in [267] designed a reward
price-based incentive mechanism for peers to cache the video
replicas to satisfy all peers’ demand. Videos in the system are
categorized into different classes, each consisting of videos of
similar popularity associated with a price. The VoD provider
determines these prices such that the number of supplied video
replicas equals the demand. First, it defines the refreshing
probability of each peer, i.e., the probability that the peer clears
its local storage. Second, it defines the storage probability
which can be considered to be the popularity of a video. Since
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each peer decides whether to cache a video based on the price
of the video, the price of each video is proportional to the
refreshing probability, the desired number of replicas of the
video in the system, and inversely proportional to the storage
probability. For example, videos which are more popular have
higher prices to incentivize more peers to cache them so as to
meet the greedy cache requirement [268].
In reality, the VoD provider always considers its profit when
setting prices for videos. The authors in [269] addressed this
problem by investigating strategic pricing to minimize the
VoD provider’s operation cost. The VoD provider calculates
the operation cost involving the upload cost to the cloud and
the reward price paid to peers. The upload cost is proportional
to the difference amount between the desired videos and
the supplied videos. The reward price is the total cost paid
to all peers due to their video contributions. The operation
cost is a continuous and convex function of the reward cost.
Thus, given a budget for reward prices, it was proved that
there exists a unique solution of the reward price to the cost
minimization problem. The simulation results revealed that
compared with the approaches without using any incentive
scheme, the proposed approach reduces significantly the opera-
tion cost, especially when the upload cost of servers increases.
In practice, there is a fraction of peers which may not be
sensitive to the reward prices. Thus, the cost may be reduced
further if the VoD provider can learn the real sensitivity of the
peers.
4) Pricing models for resource allocation in cloud-assisted
P2P streaming systems: This section reviews a few pricing
approaches to provide incentive to peers in cloud-assisted P2P
streaming systems. Cloud-assisted P2P streaming systems are
similar to the P2P-assisted cloud-based VoD models [270].
However, in the cloud-assisted P2P streaming systems, there
is no specific VoD provider, and thus stakeholders involve only
peers and streaming servers in the cloud.
As presented in [71], the cloud as a buyer rents resources
including network bandwidth, storage space, and CPU, from
peers as sellers, namely helpers, to contribute video contents
to its customers. The cloud offers the service price, and
then the peers decide their resource contributions. Thus, the
Stackelberg game can be used. Each peer, i.e., a follower,
computes its payoff which is the difference between the price
offered by the cloud, i.e., the leader, and the cost incurred
to offer the resource. The strategy of the peers is to find
the amount of resources to maximize their own payoffs. The
optimal amount can be determined by using the first-order
derivative. Given the total amount of the resources from peers,
the cloud determines the offered price to maximize its revenue.
The approach in [71] did not consider the budget of the
cloud. The authors in [271] adopted the Stackelberg game to
analyze the upload bandwidth sharing between helpers and
a streaming server resided in the cloud, taking into account
the budget of the server. In the first stage, the server, i.e., the
leader, announces its budget. The second stage can be con-
sidered to be a non-cooperative game among selfish helpers,
i.e., followers, which decide the number of bandwidth units to
maximize their own utilities. The utility is the difference be-
tween the reward that the helper receives and its video sharing
cost. Generally, the utility is a strictly concave function of the
number of bandwidth units. By using the second derivative,
it was proved that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
involving optimal strategies of helpers. Given the helpers’
strategies, the server determines the budget to maximize its
utility, which is the gain from the total transmitted video
minus the reward paid to the helpers. In particular, the gain
is characterized by the two-parameter rate-distortion model
which expresses the trade-off between the allocated bandwidth
and the video content distortion. The utility is a strictly
concave function of the budget. It was also proved that there
is a unique budget value which maximizes the utility.
The server can determine an optimal value of budget only
if it has full information about the helpers’ utility functions.
In real scenarios, this assumption may not be valid since the
helpers autonomously decide their upload bandwidth contri-
butions. Thus, the reverse auction can be used. The server,
i.e., the buyer, broadcasts a vector of bandwidth demands to
helpers, i.e., sellers. Interested helpers submit to the server
their asks including the number of bandwidth units and the
prices that they are willing to pay. Given the asks, the server
computes its utility. The utility is the difference between the
value that the server would pay if it did not receive helps from
helpers and the sum of asking prices. The server needs to select
a set of winners to maximize the utility within its budget. The
optimization problem is NP-hard. However, the server’s utility
was proved to have the submodularity property. Thus, the win-
ner determination and the payment rules can be implemented
by using the results on the budget feasible mechanism design
in [272] for submodular functions. The experiment results
showed that the reverse auction-based approach outperforms
the greedy algorithm in terms of server utility and truthfulness.
However, the number of shared bandwidth units achieved in
the reverse auction-based is less than that of the Stackelberg
game-based approach, which can access to full information
about the helper utility function.
C. Cloud-based Wireless Multimedia Social Networks
(CWMSN)
Cloud-based Wireless Multimedia Social Networks
(CWMSN) are proposed to support heterogeneous services
to users. The CWMSN model is shown in Fig. 23 which
is essentially a combination of the multimedia cloud and
different subnetworks. These subnetworks are based on the
various social contexts, e.g., family, interest, and hobby. The
system includes content providers, desktop users, and mobile
users. The content providers deliver their live programs
such as live-streaming and VoD, video conferences, VoIP,
photo sharing and editing to the desktop users through
distributed servers and gateways. Desktop users have higher
computational capability and more resources than those of
the mobile users. Therefore, desktop users can share their
resources, i.e., the bandwidth, with mobile users which want
to obtain live programs. Since the mobile users are selfish for
resource competition, game theory-based pricing schemes are
appropriate solutions to analyze the bandwidth sharing.
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Fig. 23. Cloud-based multimedia social network architecture.
1) Stackelberg game: In the context of CWMSN, the au-
thors in [273] addressed the bandwidth sharing issue between
the desktop users and the mobile users. The desktop users
decide the amount of bandwidth and the corresponding price,
and then each mobile user selects the specific desktop user to
connect to. The interactions between them can be formulated
as the Stackelberg game in which the desktop users are leaders
and the mobile users are followers. Mobile users are not fully
rational when making their decisions, and their behaviors are
thus modeled by the evolutionary game. Initially, each mobile
user in a group randomly connects to a desktop user and
calculates its utility based on the allocated bandwidth and
the price offered by the desktop user. The mobile user also
computes the average utility of the group. If the average utility
is greater than its own utility, the mobile user changes its
connection to another desktop user to possibly receive higher
utility. Otherwise, it keeps the current connection. This process
is repeated until all mobile users in the same group achieve
equal utility at the equilibrium. Given the result of the mobile
users’ evolution, desktop users compete with each other in a
non-cooperative game by deciding the amounts of bandwidth
and corresponding prices to maximize its utility. The solution
of the non-cooperative game is the Nash equilibrium which
is computed by finding a fixed point of the best response
functions of all desktop users [274]. However, the proof for
the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium was not
given.
The bandwidth allocation in [273] is the proportional alloca-
tion mechanism, meaning that different mobile users receive
the same amount of bandwidth if the ratio of their bids to
their minimum bandwidth requirements is a constant. This is
unfair to the desktop users since the mobile users may pay less
while they still receive the requested amount of bandwidth, as
long as the ratio is constant. The authors in [275] introduced
a punishment coefficient to evaluate the bandwidth of the
mobile user obtained from the desktop user. The punishment
coefficient is the ratio of a mobile user’s bid and its minimum
bandwidth requirement. The mobile user is considered to
have a cheating behavior if its punishment coefficient is less
than one since its bid cannot be lower than its minimum
bandwidth requirement. Then, the bandwidth obtained by the
mobile user will be reduced by the corresponding punishment.
The simulation results highlighted that with the proposed
solution, i.e., the cheat-proof strategy, each mobile user must
honestly bid the amount of bandwidth which is equal to its
minimum bandwidth requirement to obtain its desired amount.
By contrast, with the non-cheat-proof method, the mobile users
can obtain the same amount of bandwidth, but they only pay
less.
In practice, the Nash equilibrium as mentioned in [273]
and [275] cannot be obtained if the desktop users do not
have the information about each other’s strategies, i.e., the
amount of shared bandwidth and the price. Learning-based
algorithms that adjust strategies toward increasing the utility
of the desktop users can be used to update this information.
2) Generic pricing mechanism: The approaches in [273]
and [275] did not consider the characteristic of mobile users.
Using the same model, on the contrary, the authors in [276]
divided the mobile users into two categories which are price-
sensitive users and QoS-sensitive users. Each desktop user
determines its two pseudo-demand functions corresponding to
these two types of mobile users. In general, these functions
depend on the possible maximum number of mobile users and
the bandwidth price. The desktop user formulates its benefit
maximization problem based on the demand functions. The
problem is then solved by using the first-order derivative
and the Girolamo Cardano algorithm [277] which provides
the optimal price to each desktop user. Since the number of
mobile users connecting to a specific desktop user may vary in
each time period due to price changes by other desktop users,
the desktop user needs to continuously adjust the bandwidth
price to maximize its utility. The desktop users may change
their bandwidth prices until their total non-decreasing utility
is unchanged. However, the price adjustments did not consider
the constraints on the available bandwidth of the desktop users.
Summary: In this section, we have discussed two major
issues in cloud-based VoD systems. We have reviewed eco-
nomic and pricing approaches for these issues. A summary of
these approaches is given in Table XII. As shown in the table,
most approaches address the bandwidth allocation issue in the
cloud-based VoD systems since the bandwidth consumption
for the video distribution in these systems is crucial. Moreover,
the Stackelberg game is considered to be an efficient pricing
model in guaranteeing utility maximization for both sellers
and buyers. In the next section, we review economic and
pricing approaches for the resource management in cloud-
based Software Defined Wireless Network (SDWN) model.
SDWN is a combination of the cloud (i.e., the cloud data
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TABLE XII
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD-BASED VOD SYSTEMS.
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
C
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ed
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D
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st
em
[250]
Combinatorial
auction
Cloud
providers
VoD
provider
Video
instances
Given sellers’ asks, the buyer selects the winner
based on the difference between the price evaluated
by the buyer minus sellers’ asking prices. The
payment is based on the Vickrey auction
Cost minimization, and
truthfulness
Optimal
solution
[253] Generic pricing
Public
cloud
providers
VoD
providers
Probabilistic
bandwidth
guarantees
A broker determines the bounds of price offered to
each buyer based on the Gaussian distribution of the
buyer’s demand and the pricing policy of the sellers
Bandwidth reservation
cost minimization, and
cloud resource
efficiency optimization
Nash
equilibrium
[256]
Non-
cooperative
game
Broker VoDproviders
Cloud
bandwidth
Buyers submit their pricing strategies, and optimal
prices are achieved using the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality and the proof by contradiction
Utility maximization
for buyers
Nash
equilibrium
[257]
Utility
maximization
Cloud
provider
VoD
providers
Egress
network
bandwidth
Seller updates the price using the first-order partial
derivative of its total cost. Then, the buyer
determines its optimal resource allocation based on
the updated price
Social welfare
maximization, and
profit maximization
Optimal
solution
[258]
Utility
maximization
Cloud
provider
VoD
providers
Egress
network
bandwidth
Buyers update the price using the first-order
derivative of their utility functions. The seller
determines the optimal resource allocation for buyers
Social welfare
maximization, and
profit maximization
Optimal
solution
P2
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[78]
Stackelberg
game
Cloud
provider Users Bandwidth
The VoD provider sets the price using the
usage-based pricing. Buyers select bit rates to
maximize their utilities, and then the VoD provider
sets the price so as to maximize its revenue. Each
buyer recalculates the optimal bit rate
Optimal bit rate for
buyers, and revenue
maximization for the
seller
Stackelberg
equilibrium
[264] Double auction Peers Peers
Video
segment
If an ask of a seller is less than a bid of a buyer,
there is a transaction at which the price is the
average of the ask and the bid
Ex-post individual
rationality, budget
balance, and cloud
bandwidth reduction
Market
equilibrium
[267] Generic pricing Peers
VoD
provider
Video
caching
service
Buyer sets the price for caching video depending on
the refreshing probability, the desired number of
replicas of the video in the system, and the storage
probability of the video
Ex-post individual
rationality, budget
balance, and cloud
bandwidth reduction
Market
equilibrium
[269]
Cost
minimization Peers
VoD
provider
Video
caching
service
Buyer calculates its operation cost involving its
upload cost to the cloud and the reward price paid to
peers. The reward price is the solution of the
operation cost minimization problem
Operation cost
minimization
Optimal
solution
[71]
Stackelberg
game Peers Cloud
Network
bandwidth,
storage
space, and
CPU power
Buyer offers the price for contributing its video
contents, and then sellers decide their optimal
resource contributions. Given the total resource
contribution, the buyer determines the offered price
by using the first derivative
Payoff maximization
for sellers, and utility
maximization for buyer
Stackelberg
equilibrium
[271]
Stackelberg
game Peers
Streaming
server
Upload
bandwidth
Sellers decide the number of bandwidth units based
on the buyer’s budget. Then, the buyer determines
the optimal budget using the first-order derivative
Utility maximization
for sellers and buyer
Stackelberg
equilibrium
[271] Reverse auction Peers
Streaming
server
Upload
bandwidth
The buyer computes its utility based on sellers’ asks.
The winner determination and the payment rules are
implemented based on the budget feasible
mechanism design for submodular functions
Truthfulness, and utility
maximization for buyer
Nash
equilibrium
C
W
M
SN
[273]
Stackelberg
game
Desktop
users
Mobile
users Bandwidth
Each buyer in a group will change the current
connection to the seller until all buyers in the group
achieve the equal utility. Then, sellers compete with
each other by deciding the amounts of bandwidth
and the corresponding prices
Equal utilities for
buyers, and payoff
maximization for
sellers
Stackelberg
equilibrium
[275]
Stackelberg
game
Desktop
users
Mobile
users Bandwidth
Same as [273], but a punishment coefficient is
introduced to avoid the cheating behavior of buyers.
The coefficient is the ratio of a buyer’s bid and its
minimum bandwidth requirement
Equal utilities for
buyers, payoff
maximization and
fairness for sellers
Stackelberg
equilibrium
[276] Generic pricing
Desktop
users
Mobile
users Bandwidth
Each seller determines the pseudo-demand function
of the bandwidth demand of buyers and then
formulates its benefit maximization problem
Utility maximization
for sellers, and efficient
allocation
Utility
equilibrium
center networking), Software-Defined Networking (SDN), and
wireless networks.
VIII. APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS
FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD-BASED SDWN
Distributed data centers in cloud data center networking
as discussed in Section IV can reduce data transfer cost
and delay for users. However, the geo-distributed networks
increase the difficulty of global resource management unless
there is a centralized control. SDN (see Section II-B4) provides
a real-time centralized control based on both instantaneous
network status and user defined policies. In practice, SDN
has been adopted in wireless networks to form the Software
Defined Wireless Network (SDWN) [278], [279], [280] for
the centralized control and global optimization [281]. Thus,
data center networking can be combined with SDWN, namely
cloud-based SDWN, for complex network management as
illustrated in Fig. 24. In the network model, the SDN controller
acts as a “brain” of the network. It monitors and allocates
resources from data centers to users via wireless networks, i.e.,
cellular networks and WiFi hotspots. Such centralized resource
management usually aims at optimizing the total benefit of
all stakeholders. Thus, economic and pricing models such as
bargaining game, network utility maximization, and stackel-
berg game, are appropriate solutions since their outcomes can
guarantee maximizing the overall utilities of all stakeholders.
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TABLE XIII
A SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MAJOR APPROACHES FOR THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD-BASED VOD SYSTEMS.
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[250]
• Achieve economic efficiency
• Avoid collusion
• Have high computational complexity
• Support only one VoD provider
[258]
• Support multiple VoD providers
• Minimize communication overhead
• Have slow convergence
• Support only one cloud provider
[78]
• Have stable equilibrium
• Achieve win-win solution • Have slow convergence
[269]
• Adaptive to nonasymptotic system and highly
dynamic video popularity
• Be challenging to learn the feature of system
dynamics and adjust the pricing scheme
[271] • Achieve computational efficiency
• Do not support online situations, i.e., the avail-
able bandwidth changes dynamically
[275] • Prevent cheating behaviors
• Have unstable equilibrium
• Require having information about each other’s
strategies
In particular, the economic and pricing models have been used
to address the following issues.
• Bandwidth allocation: Bandwidth allocation in the cloud-
based SDWN is to allocate bandwidth from data centers
owned by cloud providers to Service Providers (SPs)
and mobile users in a centralized manner at the SDN
controller. Economic and pricing models have been used
to maximize the payoffs for cloud providers, service
providers, and mobile users simultaneously.
• Mobile data offloading: Mobile data offloading, also
known as WiFi offloading, is the use of complementary
network technologies to reduce the amount of data being
transferred through cellular networks. In the cloud-based
SDWN, the mobile data offloading is enabled by SDN
at an edge of the network to dynamically position or
reposition the traffic. However, since the complementary
networks and cellular networks may belong to different
parties, the traffic offloading is implementable only if the
benefits of the parties are satisfied. Economic and pricing
models such as the contract theory have been adopted to
guarantee the condition.
Before discussing these approaches, the cost analysis is intro-
duced to evaluate the cost of wireless networks when SDN is
enabled.
A. Cost analysis
The authors in [55] analyzed the costs of the LTE network
owned by a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) with and
without SDN, denoted as SDN-LTE and non-SDN-LTE, re-
spectively. The Finnish mobile network topology was adopted
as a reference model. The costs generally are divided into the
CAPital EXpenditure (CAPEX) and OPerational EXpenditure
(OPEX). CAPEX involves costs of network equipments and
their deployment cost. The SDN-LTE configuration is imple-
mented in a more centralized manner, and thus the deployment
cost is lower than that of non-SDN-LTE. OPEX includes
energy consumption, site visits, and network management ex-
penses. Since SDN increases the automation of fault detection,
the network management expenses in SDN-LTE are expected
to decrease compared with those in non-SDN-LTE. Moreover,
the site visit costs in the non-SDN-LTE model arise since base
stations, i.e., eNBs, and switches are distributed across the
country which may incur more travel expenses and time on
site. The quantitative results showed that SDN-LTE can reduce
the annual CAPEX by around 7.72% and the annual OPEX by
0.31% compared with non-SDN LTE. However, these savings
are relatively small compared with the total annual cost of
MNO.
Similarly, the authors in [56] evaluated the total cost of
the LTE network through CAPEX and OPEX when the
Network Function Virtualization (NFV)/SDN approaches are
implemented. Three possible scenarios were considered. The
first scenario is that MNO owns the Virtualized Network
Functions (VNFs)/SDN and hardware. CAPEX involves ini-
tial investments of the VNF/SDN software licences and the
hardware. OPEX includes the maintenance cost, variable costs
such as energy consumption and cooling cost, software update,
certificate update and bug fixing costs. In the second scenario,
MNO owns VNF/SDN and rents hardware. CAPEX is still the
VNF/SDN software licenses, but OPEX is the annual rental
fee for the required hardware. In the third scenario, MNO rents
both VNF/SDN and hardware. In this case, there is no CAPEX
while OPEX involves the cost incurred for VNF/SDN, annual
service charge, e.g., the hardware and software maintenance,
and energy consumption. The simulation showed that the total
cost when VNF/SDN are used is always lower than that
without VNF/SDN. Moreover, the total cost in the second
scenario is the lowest over the period from 2014 to 2019.
The evaluations using the above cost model show the benefit
in terms of cost minimization when SDN is enabled. In
the following, we provide some other economic and pricing
models for the SDN-based resource management in the cloud-
based SDWN. Note that although most approaches in this
section addressed the issues in the cloud-based SDWN, a
few wireline-enabled SDN models, e.g., SDN-enabled home
networks, will be also discussed as an extension.
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Fig. 24. An illustration of cloud-based software-defined wireless network.
B. Bargaining Game for Bandwidth Allocation
Considering the cloud-based SDWN, the authors in [86]
investigated the issue of sharing resources, i.e., CPU, mem-
ory and bandwidth, among service providers to extend their
capabilities in serving mobile users. The service providers
can be divided into sellers and buyers. The main objective
is to guarantee QoS for users while maximizing the total
increased utility of all sellers and buyers. Thus, the Nash
bargaining game with cooperation policy was adopted. The
sellers cooperate with each other to form a resource pool, and
the buyers bid for the resources in the resource pool with
a unit price. The increased utility of the seller is obtained
from leasing resources and the price while the increased utility
of the buyer is defined by the difference of its utility after
and before renting resources from the sellers. The objective
function is the total increased utility of all buyers and sellers.
The deal price is then determined based on the Cardano’s
formula [282], and the basic optimization is used to obtain
the total allocated resource. The buyers share the total re-
source corresponding to their demands. The simulation results
showed that the proposed approach increases both allocated
resources for buyers and revenue for sellers compared with
the bargaining game in which buyers compete with each other.
However, the bargaining game with the competition policy is
more appropriate in the realistic scenarios due to the resource
scarcity.
C. Pricing Models for Mobile Data Offloading
As shown in Fig. 24, Access Points (APs) can be integrated
in the cloud-based SDWN to minimize the cloud bandwidth
consumption for the base stations [283], and thus reducing the
service cost and latency for mobile users. In this context, two
economic and pricing models were adopted corresponding to
two specific scenarios. In the first scenario, the access points
and base stations are owned by one service provider, and
the aim of the mobile data offloading is to maximize utility
functions of all mobile users. Thus, the NUM framework
was used. In the second scenario, the access points and base
stations are owned by different providers, and the access points
will only admit the traffic from base stations under some
conditions. The negotiation on these conditions between the
access points and the base stations can be modeled using a
contract theory. Further details of the two pricing models are
as follows.
1) Utility maximization: In the first scenario, the authors
in [284] considered allocating the heterogeneous bandwidth
including the cloud and WiFi bandwidth to the mobile users
by using the NUM framework (see Section III-C). The utility
of each mobile user is a strictly concave function of the
heterogeneous bandwidth allocated to the mobile user. The
method of Lagrange multipliers is used to solve the optimiza-
tion problem with their interpretations as cloud bandwidth and
WiFi bandwidth prices that the users are willing to pay. At
each iteration, the bandwidth prices are updated by using the
gradient projection method. Then, the allocated bandwidth is
updated by the SDN controller. It was proved that there always
exists a unique optimal solution for the allocated bandwidth
and the prices. The simulation showed that the proposed
approach outperforms the baseline approach in terms of the
total network utility. The baseline approach did not use SDN as
well as heterogeneous bandwidth. However, as stated in [257]
and [258], multiple SDN controllers need to be considered to
enhance the scalability of the system.
2) Contract theory: In the second scenario, the contract
model was adopted which allows to construct several traffic-
payment bundles, e.g., the amount of traffic that the access
point needs to offload and the corresponding payment that the
base station needs to offer. The authors in [285] used three
contract theoretic models for the service trading between the
base station and the access points in SDN, namely perfect
discrimination, linear pricing, and anti adverse selection. In
the perfect discrimination, there does not exist the information
asymmetry, meaning that the idle capacities of the access
points are known by the base station. In this scenario, the base
station can solve its payoff optimization problems separately
for each access point. The base station’s payoff associated
with an access point is defined as the monetary gain through
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the offloaded traffic minus its payment to the access point,
given the constraint that the access point’s payoff is equal
to or greater than zero. By taking the derivative of the
objective function, an optimal payment to the access point
and the amount of offloaded traffic can be obtained. The
optimal payment is that the marginal valuation equals the
marginal cost. On the contrary, in the linear pricing, the base
station does not know access points’ idle capacities, but it has
knowledge of the probability that the access point has a certain
idle capacity. Therefore, the base station only specifies a unit
of traffic per payment for the offloading process. In particular,
the base station formulates its payoff optimization problem
by calculating the expected payment requested by the access
points through the probability functions. Then, the optimal
amount of traffic per payment to the access points is obtained
by taking the first derivative of the objective function.
Obviously, the payoff of the base station in the perfect
discrimination is higher than that in the linear pricing. How-
ever, in the perfect discrimination, there is no compatible
incentive for the access points since their payoffs are zero.
To obtain an incentive compatible contract, the anti adverse
selection is used. The anti adverse selection is similar to
the perfect discrimination. However, the constraint of the
incentive compatibility for access points is added into the
optimization problem of the perfect discrimination (i.e., the
base station’s payoff maximization). This problem was then
solved by using the Lagrange multiplier method to determine
the optimal contract, i.e., the traffic-payment, for each access
point. As shown in the simulation results, the linear pricing
gives the access points the highest payoff, followed by the
anti adverse selection, and then the perfect discrimination. On
the contrary, the base station gets the maximum payoff in the
perfect discrimination since it has full knowledge of access
points’ idle capacities.
D. Stackelberg Game for Bandwidth Allocation in SDN-
Enabled Home Networks
SDN can be combined with the existing home networks as
shown in Fig. 24 to maintain users’ Quality of Experience
(QoE) and guarantee the QoE [286]. In this setting, home
networks are connected to the service providers via a digital
subscribe line or broadband cable link, and users request con-
tent services from the service provider through the subscribe
lines.
Typically, service providers rent cloud bandwidth from
cloud providers to deliver their contents to users. The au-
thors in [287] investigated maximizing payoffs for the ser-
vice provider and users by adopting the Stackelberg game.
The service provider, i.e., the leader, charges the users, i.e.,
followers, for their requesting services via SDN according to
the time-dependent usage-based pricing strategy [288]. The
service provider also gives a reimbursement to the user, which
is proportional to the amount of traffic that the user shares
with other neighboring users. Thus, the payoff of the service
provider is the difference between the total service price
from the users and the total reimbursement. The user’s payoff
is the utility function of the allocated resources minus the
charge that it pays the service provider. Given the service
provider’s pricing and reimbursement strategy, the users aim
to maximize their payoffs by choosing traffic consumption and
the amount of sharing bandwidth. The optimization problems
of users are solved based on the Lagrange multiplier with
the subgradient projection method. Based on these optimal
solutions, the service provider determines the pricing and
reimbursement strategy so as to maximize its payoff function.
The numerical results showed that the payoffs of both the
user and the service provider from the proposed approach
improve 400% compared with that in the best-effort home
network with usage-based pricing [288]. However, the impact
of limited backhaul capacity on the payoff functions needs to
be considered in the future work.
We close this section with an approach which addresses the
price-based bandwidth allocation for control applications in
SDN as proposed in [289] and [290]. The aim is to maximize
the rate of control applications while guaranteeing the fairness
of allocation among them. The fairness criterion means that
the rate of a control application is proportional to the price of
bandwidth paid by the control application. The optimization
problem is to maximize the sum of the rate of each control
application multiplied with the corresponding price given the
limited capacity. The optimization problem is a strictly convex
function of the allocated rate. Therefore, there exists a unique
optimal solution for the rate for each control application.
However, the flow table, an essential network resource in SDN,
needs to be considered in the future work.
Summary: This section discusses the applications of eco-
nomic and pricing models in cloud-based SDWN. The existing
approaches which address the resource management in the
network are summarized in Table XIV. In general, the number
of existing approaches is relatively small, and most of them
investigated the bandwidth allocation. More studies need to be
done, for example, for the mobile data offloading.
IX. REVIEW SUMMARY, OPEN ISSUES AND FUTURE
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
A number of approaches reviewed in this survey show the
importance of economic aspects not only for business develop-
ment, but also for system design and optimization. Evidently,
economic and pricing models have addressed various issues
in cloud networking models in which traditional algorithms
becomes less effective or cannot be applied. Apart from the
existing approaches, there are still challenges, open issues, and
new research directions as discussed in the following.
1) False-name bidding in double auction: In the reviewed
approaches based on double auction [190], [207], [209], [210],
[229], multiple cloud resources are sold simultaneously. As
such, one bidder can submit multiple bids using different
identities so as to gain an additional profit. The bidding process
which is implemented under fictitious identities is called
false-name bidding [291], and the double auction with the
false-name bidding is no longer dominant-strategy incentive
compatible. Therefore, robust mechanisms against the false-
name bidding, e.g., the Threshold Price Double (TPD) auction
protocol [292], for cloud bandwidth reservation need to be
investigated.
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TABLE XIV
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD-BASED SDWN
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Objective SolutionSeller Buyer Item
C
lo
ud
-b
as
ed
SD
W
N
[55] Cost model
Mobile
network
operator
Users Networkingresources
Buyer evaluates the costs of the LTE network when
SDN is enabled. Two types of cost are introduced,
i.e, CAPEX (fixed costs) and OPEX (variable costs)
Seller’s profit
maximization
Cost
optimization
[56] Cost model
Mobile
network
operator
Users Networkingresources
Same as [55], but three scenarios are considered
when evaluating the operation cost of the LTE
network
Seller’s profit
maximization
Cost
optimization
[86]
Bargaining
game
Selling
SPs
Buying
SPs
CPU,
memory,
and
bandwidth
The objective is to maximize the total increased
utility of all buyers and sellers. The deal price is
determined based on the Cardano’s formula, and the
total allocated resource is obtained using the first
derivative
Increased utility
maximization for both
buyers and sellers
Nash
bargaining
solution
[284]
Utility
maximization SP Users Bandwidth
The method of Lagrange multipliers is adopted. At
each iteration, the bandwidth prices are updated by
using the gradient projection method, and then the
allocated bandwidth for buyers is updated by the
seller
Total network utility
maximization
Optimal
solution
[285] Contract theory
Access
points
Base
station
Mobile data
offloading
service
Three contract theoretic models for the service
trading are used, that are perfect discrimination,
linear pricing, and anti adverse selection. In
particular for the anti adverse selection, the seller
determines the optimal prices and the amounts of
bandwidth using the Lagrange multiplier method
Payoff maximization,
incentive compatibility,
and individual
rationality
Optimal
solution
[287]
Stackelberg
game SP Users Bandwidth
Seller sets the bandwidth price based on the
time-dependent usage-based pricing strategy. Then,
buyers choose the amount of bandwidth based on the
Lagrange multiplier method. The seller finally
determines the bandwidth price
Payoff maximization
for sellers and buyers
Stackelberg
equilibrium
TABLE XV
A SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF MAJOR APPROACHES FOR THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN CLOUD-BASED SDWN.
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[86]
• Achieve flexible resource management and
demand-driven resource distribution • Be not appropriate in the realistic scenarios
[284]
• Manage resource in a centralized and holistic
manner
• Enable reliable functional verification
• Be unscalable
• Do not support heterogeneous resource alloca-
tion
• Support only one SDN controller
[285]
• Overcome the information asymmetry
• Support multiple traffic-payment bundles • Support only one SDN controller
[287]
• Adapt to both real-time and non-real-time ser-
vice requests
• Be resilient to demand fluctuations
• Support only one service provider
2) Collusion in auction: Apart from the false-name bidding
cheating, bidders in the reviewed approaches based on auction,
i.e., the VCG auction [124], [224], the combinatorial auction
[192], and the double auction [190], [207], [209], [210],
[229], may collude with each other through coordinating their
bids. This suppresses the competition for cloud resource, thus
reducing the price that the bidders must pay for the cloud
resource. However, the collusion behavior will degrade the
efficiency of the resource allocation as well as the cloud
provider’s revenue. Collusion-resistant mechanisms thus need
to be applied. Pricing strategies can be used to provide the
bidders incentives not to perform the collusion behavior.
3) Resource demand forecasting methods: As discussed in
[158] (see Section IV-A8), resource demand fluctuation of
cloud tenants impacts the availability of resources, the pricing
policy as well as the profit of cloud providers. Therefore, it
is important for the cloud provider to predict the workload
fluctuation. However, there was only one technique intro-
duced for the demand forecast, i.e., the Markov chain model.
Therefore, more advanced techniques need to be adopted to
improve the performance of resource demand prediction in
cloud networking environment. Some candidate methods are
fuzzy logic [293], neural networks [294], machine learning
[295], and a joint statistical learning and optimal decision-
making [296].
4) Pricing models for multipath routing in cloud data center
networking: Data centers consist of several hundreds and
thousands of servers [297]. The servers are connected with
each other through multi-rooted hierarchical topologies, e.g.,
the fat tree topology [298], which provide multipath between
each pair of servers. A simple example is shown in Fig. 25 in
which there are two different paths, i.e., a1 and a2, between
servers 1 and 2. Efficient routing strategies are thus necessary.
Traditional routing algorithms such as distance vector [299]
and link state [300] do not support the multipath routing
efficiently because they make routing decisions only based on
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packet destinations. This means that all packets to the same
destination are routed through the same path which may result
in congestion. By taking into account the multipath feature,
pricing approaches such as auction are efficient solutions for
the path selection to achieve a highly load-balanced network
and minimize network latency. For example, the reverse auc-
tion can be used at the switch A which acts as a buyer to select
path a1 or a2 based on asking prices submitted from switches
B and C, i.e., sellers. The asking price of switch B or C is
proportional to the total congestion level of links connected to
the switch and the number of hops from the switch towards
the destination. The path containing the lowest asking price is
selected for forwarding the packet.
Core 
switch
ToR 
switch
Server 1 Server 2
A
(buyer)
B 
(seller)
C
(seller)
D
Asking 
price
Asking 
price
a1
a2
Fig. 25. Multipath routing in data center networks based on reserve auction.
5) Pricing models in cloud robotics: Cloud robotics is a
combination of robotic technology with network and cloud
computing infrastructure [301], [302]. Robots benefit from
powerful computing, storage, and communication resources of
data centers in the cloud. This integration enables robotic sys-
tems to be smarter, faster, and less expensive. A common cloud
robotic system is shown in Fig. 26. Multiple robots are con-
nected with data centers through wired or wireless networks
to perform tasks. The proxy allocates resources in the cloud to
the client robots. Since robotic applications require real-time
execution, the key challenge is the low-latency response given
network bandwidth constraint. Therefore, efficient bandwidth
allocation among robots is of great importance. Resource
management mechanisms such as auction or Stackelberg game
are promising solutions since they model an interaction among
client robots. For example, auctions can be adopted among
client robots, i.e., buyers, which compete for the connectivity
provided by a relay robot, i.e., a seller [303]. To maximize the
utility of relay or client robots and cloud provider’s profits, the
Stackelberg game can be used [304], [305] in which the cloud
provider, i.e., the leader, optimizes bandwidth price, and client
robots, i.e., followers, choose their transmission rates.
6) Economic and pricing models in Network Function Vir-
tualization (NFV): Network Function Virtualization (NFV) is
a concept that leverages virtualization technologies to offer a
new way for designing, deploying, and managing networking
services. NFV and SDN are closely related technologies which
are implemented through the software running on physical
Data center Data center 
Access
 proxy
Client 
robots
Client (relay) 
robots
Fig. 26. An architecture of typical cloud robotic systems.
equipments. While SDN decouples the network control and
forwarding functions on a physical network equipment, NFV
decomposes network functions, e.g., a firewall, from the physi-
cal network equipment [306]. NFV brings several benefits such
as reduction of OPEX and CAPEX due to consolidating net-
working appliances [307], facilitating the deployment of new
services with increased agility and faster time-to-value, and
achieving better system scalability according to users’ demand.
However, implementing NFV introduces several challenges.
For example, physical resource sharing among multiple users
can lead to congestion on the physical infrastructure as well as
an unfair use of the resources [308], [309]. Pricing approaches
such as auction or smart data pricing can be adopted to offer
incentives to users to use resources efficiently.
X. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a comprehensive survey of the
applications of economic and pricing theories to resource
management in cloud networking. Firstly, we have described a
general architecture of the cloud networking including its com-
ponents and corresponding services. Then, we have introduced
and analyzed various pricing models with the objectives to
understand the motivations of using the economic and pricing
theory in cloud networking. Afterwards, we have provided
detailed reviews, analyses, and comparisons of the approaches
using economic and pricing theories to solve a variety of issues
in specific systems of cloud networking, i.e., the cloud data
center networking, mobile cloud networking, edge computing,
cloud-based VoD system, and cloud-based SDWN. Finally, we
have outlined open issues as well as future research directions.
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